Power, cooperation indices and coalition structures
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hdl:2117/23234
Document typePart of book or chapter of book
Defense date2013
PublisherSpringer
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Abstract
The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. the book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publication
CitationAmer, R.; Carreras, F. Power, cooperation indices and coalition structures. A: "Power, voting, and voting power: 30 years after". Berlín: Springer, 2013, p. 247-263.
ISBN978-3-642-35928-6
Publisher versionhttp://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_13
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