Power, cooperation indices and coalition structures

Amer Ramon, Rafael; Carreras Escobar, Francisco

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_13

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Amer Ramon, Rafael

Carreras Escobar, Francisco

Document typePart of book or chapter of book

Defense date2013

PublisherSpringer

Rights accessRestricted access - publisher's policy

Abstract

The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. the book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publication

CitationAmer, R.; Carreras, F. Power, cooperation indices and coalition structures. A: "Power, voting, and voting power: 30 years after". Berlín: Springer, 2013, p. 247-263.

URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/23234

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_13

ISBN978-3-642-35928-6

Publisher versionhttp://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_13

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