Stressed web environments as strategic games: risk profiles and Weltanschauung
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Estadístiques de LA Referencia / Recolecta
Inclou dades d'ús des de 2022
Cita com:
hdl:2117/11226
Tipus de documentText en actes de congrés
Data publicació2010
EditorPublicació Electrònica en CD-ROM
Condicions d'accésAccés obert
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continguts d'aquesta obra estan subjectes a la llicència de Creative Commons
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Reconeixement-NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 3.0 Espanya
Abstract
We consider the behaviour of a set of services in a stressed
web environment where performance patterns may be di cult to pre-
dict. In stressed environments the performances of some providers may
degrade while the performances of others, with elastic resources, may
improve. The allocation of web-based providers to users (brokering) is
modelled by a strategic non-cooperative angel-daemon game with risk
pro les. A risk pro le speci es a bound on the number of unreliable ser-
vice providers within an environment without identifying the names of
these providers. Risk pro les o er a means of analysing the behaviour of
broker agents which allocate service providers to users. A Nash equilib-
rium is a xed point of such a game in which no user can locally improve
their choice of provider { thus, a Nash equilibrium is a viable solution
to the provider/user allocation problem. Angel daemon games provide a
means of reasoning about stressed environments and o er the possibility
of designing brokers using risk pro les and Nash equilibria.
CitacióGabarro, J. [et al.]. Stressed web environments as strategic games: risk profiles and Weltanschauung. A: Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing. "Fifth Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing". München: Publicació Electrònica en CD-ROM, 2010, p. 1-16.
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