Random masking interleaved scrambling technique as a countermeasure for DPA/DEMA attacks in cache memories
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Estadístiques de LA Referencia / Recolecta
Inclou dades d'ús des de 2022
Cita com:
hdl:2117/99300
Tipus de documentText en actes de congrés
Data publicació2016-11-15
Condicions d'accésAccés obert
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continguts d'aquesta obra estan subjectes a la llicència de Creative Commons
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Reconeixement-NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 3.0 Espanya
Abstract
Memory remanence in SRAMs and DRAMs is usually exploited through cold-boot attacks
and the targets are the main memory and the L2 cache memory. Hence, a sudden power
shutdown may give an attacker the opportunity to download the contents of the memory
and extract critical data.
Side-channel attacks such as differential power or differential electromagnetic analysis
have proven to be very effective against memory security. Furthermore, blending cold-boot
attacks with DPA or DEMA can overpower even a high-level of security in cache or main
memories. In this scope, data scrambling techniques have been explored and employed to
improve the security, with a minor penalty in performance. Enforcing security techniques
and methods in cache memories is risky because any substantial reduction in the cache
memory speed might be devastating to the CPU, which is why the performance penalty
must be minimal.
In this paper, we introduce an improved scrambling technique which uses random masking
of the scrambling vector and it is designed to protect cache memories against cold-boot and
differential power or electromagnetic attacks.
The technique is analyzed in terms of area, power and speed, while the level of security is
evaluated through adversary models and simulated attacks.
Fitxers | Descripció | Mida | Format | Visualitza |
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FCTRU_2016_21_Random_masking.pdf | 1,177Mb | Visualitza/Obre |