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dc.contributor.authorCarreras Escobar, Francisco
dc.contributor.authorFreixas Bosch, Josep
dc.contributor.authorMagaña Nieto, Antonio
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques
dc.coverage.spatialeast=4.38189269999998; north=50.8417893; name=Justus Lipsius Building, Rue de la Loi 175, 1000 Bruxelles, Bèlgica
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-28T15:46:31Z
dc.date.available2016-10-28T15:46:31Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationCarreras, F., Freixas, J., Magaña, A. Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems. "Operations Research and Decisions", 2016, vol. 26, núm. 2, p. 31-52.
dc.identifier.issn2081-8858
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/91241
dc.description.abstractAn analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting systems designed for the enlarged European Union adopted in the Athens summit, held in April 2003 but this analysis can be applied to any other system. First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting systems does not, in general, reduce. Next, the egalitarian effects of superposing two or three weighted majority games (often by introducing additional consensus) are considered. Finally, the decisiveness of these voting systems is evaluated and compared.
dc.format.extent22 p.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject.lcshGame theory
dc.subject.lcshDecision making -- Mathematical models
dc.subject.lcshVoting -- Mathematical models
dc.subject.otherDimension
dc.subject.otherEgalitarianism
dc.subject.otherDecisiveness
dc.subject.otherVoting systems
dc.subject.otherSimple games
dc.subject.otherWeighted majority games
dc.subject.otherShapley–Shubik power index
dc.titleDimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems
dc.typeArticle
dc.subject.lemacJocs, Teoria de
dc.subject.lemacDecisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject.lemacVot -- Models matemàtics
dc.contributor.groupUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.identifier.doi10.5277/ord160203
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91B Mathematical economics
dc.rights.accessOpen Access
local.identifier.drac19226125
dc.description.versionPostprint (author's final draft)
dc.relation.projectidinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/1PE/MTM2015-66818-P
local.citation.authorCarreras, F.; Freixas, J.; Magaña, A.
local.citation.publicationNameOperations Research and Decisions
local.citation.volume26
local.citation.number2
local.citation.startingPage31
local.citation.endingPage52


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