dc.contributor.author Álvarez Faura, M. del Carme dc.contributor.author Francès, Guillem dc.contributor.other Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes Informàtics dc.date.accessioned 2016-04-28T07:48:37Z dc.date.available 2016-04-28T07:48:37Z dc.date.issued 2007-09 dc.identifier.citation Álvarez, C., Francès, G. "Maximum congestion games on networks: How can we compute their equilibria?". 2007. dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2117/86307 dc.description.abstract We study Network Maximum Congestion Games, a class of network games where players choose a path between two given nodes in order to minimize the congestion of the bottleneck (the most congested link) of their path. For single-commodity games, we provide an algorithm which computes a Pure Nash Equilibrium in polynomial time. If all players have the same weight, the obtained equilibrium has optimum social cost. If players are allowed to have different weights, the obtained equilibrium has social cost at most 4/3 times worst than the optimum. For multi-commodity games with a fixed number of commodities and a particular graph topology, we also provide an algorithm which computes a Pure Nash Equilibria in polynomial time. We also study some issues related to the quality of the equilibria in this kind of games. dc.format.extent 19 p. dc.language.iso eng dc.relation.ispartofseries LSI-07-30-R dc.subject Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica::Informàtica teòrica dc.subject.other Network congestion games dc.subject.other Nash equilibria dc.subject.other Computational complexity dc.subject.other Edge-disjoint paths dc.title Maximum congestion games on networks: How can we compute their equilibria? dc.type External research report dc.rights.access Open Access local.identifier.drac 1891129 dc.description.version Postprint (published version) local.citation.author Álvarez, C.; Francès, G.
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