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Two revenue sharing contracts in a three-echelon supply chain with a risk-neutral or a risk-averse retailer
dc.contributor.author | Hou, Yumei |
dc.contributor.author | Wei, Fangfang |
dc.contributor.author | Tian, Xin |
dc.contributor.author | Liu, Xiaoyun |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-03-17T12:50:41Z |
dc.date.available | 2016-03-17T12:50:41Z |
dc.date.issued | 2015-12 |
dc.identifier.citation | Hou, Yumei [et al.]. Two revenue sharing contracts in a three-echelon supply chain with a risk-neutral or a risk-averse retailer. "Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management", Desembre 2015, vol. 8, núm. 5, p. 1428-1474. |
dc.identifier.issn | 2013-0953 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2117/84615 |
dc.description.abstract | Purpose: This paper compares the efficiency of two revenue-sharing contracts and discusses the members’ preference for a three-echelon supply chain with the retailer’s different risk attitude. Design/methodology/approach: This paper focuses on a three-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer. If the retailer is risk-neutral, the coordination of the supply chain based on the two revenue-sharing contracts is comparatively studied. If the retailer is downside-risk-aversion, the supply chain performance is comparatively analyzed and a risk-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, the two revenue-sharing contracts under the risk-sharing contract are still compared. Findings: Although both the two revenue-sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain with a risk-neutral retailer, they are not always able to coordinate the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer. It is interesting that the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer can be coordinated by executing a designed risk-sharing contract, which is based on any kind of revenue-sharing contract. Finally, any kind of revenue-sharing contracts is not absolutely better than another. Based on the risk-sharing contract, the retailer’s preference is equivalent between the two contracts; but for the distributor and the manufacturer, their preferences between the two contracts are positively related to their own profit share in the supply chain. Originality/value: Comprehensively comparing the two revenue-sharing contracts is the only presented research in the supply chain. |
dc.format.extent | 47 p. |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.publisher | OmniaScience |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Spain |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/es/ |
dc.subject | Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Economia i organització d'empreses::Direcció d'operacions::Modelització de transports i logística |
dc.subject.lcsh | Business logistics |
dc.subject.lcsh | Risk management |
dc.subject.other | Supply chain |
dc.subject.other | Three-echelon |
dc.subject.other | Revenue-sharing contract |
dc.subject.other | Risk-aversion |
dc.title | Two revenue sharing contracts in a three-echelon supply chain with a risk-neutral or a risk-averse retailer |
dc.type | Article |
dc.subject.lemac | Logística (Indústria) |
dc.subject.lemac | Gestió del risc |
dc.identifier.dl | B-28744-2008 |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed |
dc.rights.access | Open Access |
local.citation.publicationName | Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management |
local.citation.volume | 8 |
local.citation.number | 5 |
local.citation.startingPage | 1428 |
local.citation.endingPage | 1474 |
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2015, vol. 8, núm. 5 [23]