Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
Tipo de documentoArtículo
Fecha de publicación2016-02-09
Condiciones de accesoAcceso abierto
In order to study voting situations when voters can also abstain and the output is binary, i.e., either approval or rejection, a new extended model of voting rule was defined. Accordingly, indices of power, in particular Banzhaf’s index, were considered. In this paper we argue that in this context a power index should be a pair of real numbers, since this better highlights the power of a voter in two different cases, i.e., her being crucial when switching from being in favor to abstain, and from abstain to be contrary. We also provide an axiomatization for both indices, and from this a characterization as well of the standard Banzhaf index (the sum of the former two) is obtained. Some examples are provided to show how the indices behave.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5
CitaciónFreixas, J., Lucchetti, R. Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index. "Annals of operations research", 09 Febrer 2016, p. 1-20.