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dc.contributor.authorÁlvarez Faura, M. del Carme
dc.contributor.authorGabarró Vallès, Joaquim
dc.contributor.authorSerna Iglesias, María José
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes Informàtics
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-07T16:00:12Z
dc.date.available2016-03-07T16:00:12Z
dc.date.issued2004-11
dc.identifier.citationÁlvarez, C., Gabarró, J., Serna, M. "Pure Nash equilibria in games with a large number of actions". 2004.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/83903
dc.description.abstractWe study the computational complexity of deciding the existence of a Pure Nash Equilibrium in multi-player strategic games. We address two fundamental questions: how can we represent a game?, and how can we represent a game with polynomial pay-off functions? Our results show that the computational complexity of deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in an strategic game depends on two parameters: the number of players and the size of the sets of strategies. In particular we show that deciding the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an strategic game is NP-complete when the number of players is large and the number of strategies for each player is constant, while the problem is Sigma_2^p-complete when the number of players is a constant and the size of the sets of strategies is exponential (with respect to the length of the strategies).
dc.format.extent17 p.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLSI-04-55-R
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica::Informàtica teòrica
dc.subject.otherStrategic games
dc.subject.otherNash equilibria
dc.subject.otherComplexity classes
dc.titlePure Nash equilibria in games with a large number of actions
dc.typeExternal research report
dc.rights.accessOpen Access
local.identifier.drac1838110
dc.description.versionPostprint (published version)
local.citation.authorÁlvarez, C.; Gabarró, J.; Serna, M.


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