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dc.contributor.authorAlonso Meijide, José María
dc.contributor.authorFreixas Bosch, Josep
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III
dc.identifier.citationAlonso Meijide, J.M.; Freixas, J. A new power index based on minimal winning coalitions without any surplus. "Decision support systems", Abril 2010, vol. 49, núm. 1, p. 70-76.
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we propose a new power index useful for the evaluation of each member in a committee, or democratic institution, and the degree of influence over the voting decision making system. The proposed solution is based on the observation that democratic organizations not only tend to form coalitions which can by themselves guarantee the control of the organization, but that they also do it in an extremely efficient way that avoids the inclusion of powerful members if they can be replaced by weaker ones. The mathematical foundation of the new measure is based on two different axiomatizations. A comparison with other well-known measures is also done.
dc.format.extent7 p.
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject.lcshDecision making -- Mathematical models
dc.subject.lcshVoting -- Mathematical models
dc.subject.lcshGame theory
dc.titleA new power index based on minimal winning coalitions without any surplus
dc.subject.lemacDecisió, Presa de
dc.subject.lemacVot -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject.lemacJocs, Teoria de
dc.contributor.groupUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::60 Probability theory and stochastic processes
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences
dc.rights.accessRestricted access - author's decision
local.citation.authorAlonso Meijide, J.M.; Freixas, J.
local.citation.publicationNameDecision support systems

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