Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule

Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo

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Carreras Escobar, Francisco

Owen Salazar, Guillermo

Document typeResearch report

Defense date2009-03

Rights accessRestricted access - author's decision

Except where otherwise noted, content on this work is licensed under a Creative Commons license : Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain

Abstract

Pure bargaining problem are considered. By attaching a quasi-additive cooperative game to chatch one of them, a Shapley rule for this case of problems is derived from the classical Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes some axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the classical proportional rule.

CitationCarreras, F.; Owen, G. "Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule". 2009.

URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/7054

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