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dc.contributor.authorCarreras Escobar, Francisco
dc.contributor.authorAlonso Meijide, José María
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada II
dc.description.abstractWe propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The resulting coalitional value is a twofold extension of the Shapley value in the following sense: (1) the amount obtained by any union coincides with the Shapley value of the union in the quotient game; and (2) the players of the union share this amount proportionally to their Shapley value in the original game (i.e., without unions). We provide axiomatic characterizations of this value close to those existing in the literature for the Owen value and include applications to coalition formation in bankruptcy and voting problems.
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística
dc.subject.lcshGame theory
dc.subject.otherCooperative game
dc.subject.otherShapley value
dc.subject.otherCoalition structure
dc.subject.otherCoalitional value
dc.titleA new coalitional value
dc.typeExternal research report
dc.subject.lemacJocs, Teoria de
dc.contributor.groupUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.rights.accessRestricted access - author's decision

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
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