Coordination and growth: the Stag Hunt game on evolutionary networks
Visualitza/Obre
10.1088/1742-5468/2011/05/P05008
Inclou dades d'ús des de 2022
Cita com:
hdl:2117/367267
Tipus de documentArticle
Data publicació2011-05-06
EditorInstitute of Physics (IOP)
Condicions d'accésAccés obert
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continguts d'aquesta obra estan subjectes a la llicència de Creative Commons
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Reconeixement-NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 3.0 Espanya
Abstract
Recently, the study of evolutionary games on networks has attracted great interest, focused mainly on the problem of the emergence of cooperation. A well studied framework for this problem is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on fixed, evolving or growing networks. In this paper we present a complete picture of the behavior of another important social dilemma, the Stag Hunt game, under an evolutionary preferential attachment model, in which the network grows according to the dynamical states of the elements of the system. We observe the emergence of a scale-free and hierarchical organization of the strategies according to connectivity classes as a by-product of the diffusion of cooperation in the network. Depending on the parametrization of the game dynamics, we find a smooth transition from cooperation to defection and a polymorphic state with simultaneous presence of cooperator and defector hubs, which is very unusual in coordination games.
CitacióStarnini, M. [et al.]. Coordination and growth: the Stag Hunt game on evolutionary networks. "Journal of statistical mechanics: Theory and experiment", 6 Maig 2011, vol. 2011, núm. 5, p. P05008:1-P05008:17.
ISSN1742-5468
Versió de l'editorhttps://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-5468/2011/05/P05008
Altres identificadorshttp://hdl.handle.net/10016/15024
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