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dc.contributor.authorÁlvarez Faura, M. del Carme
dc.contributor.authorBlesa Aguilera, Maria Josep
dc.contributor.authorMolter, Hendrik
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Ciències de la Computació
dc.date.accessioned2015-06-04T08:27:45Z
dc.date.available2015-11-30T01:31:05Z
dc.date.created2014-12-10
dc.date.issued2014-12-10
dc.identifier.citationAlvarez, C.; Blesa, M.; Molter, H. Firefighting as a game. "Lecture notes in computer science", 10 Desembre 2014, núm. 8882, p. 108-119.
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/28172
dc.description.abstractThe Firefighter Problem was proposed in 1995 [16] as a deterministic discrete-time model for the spread (and containment) of a fire. Its applications reach from real fires to the spreading of diseases and the containment of floods. Furthermore, it can be used to model the spread of computer viruses or viral marketing in communication networks. In this work, we study the problem from a game-theoretical perspective. Such a context seems very appropriate when applied to large networks, where entities may act and make decisions based on their own interests, without global coordination. We model the Firefighter Problem as a strategic game where there is one player for each time step who decides where to place the firefighters. We show that the Price of Anarchy is linear in the general case, but at most 2 for trees. We prove that the quality of the equilibria improves when allowing coalitional cooperation among players. In general, we have that the Price of Anarchy is in T(n/k) where k is the coalition size. Furthermore, we show that there are topologies which have a constant Price of Anarchy even when constant sized coalitions are considered.
dc.format.extent12 p.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica::Informàtica teòrica
dc.subject.lcshGame theory
dc.subject.otherFirefighter problem
dc.subject.otherSpreading models for networks
dc.subject.otherAlgorithmic game theory
dc.subject.otherNash equilibria
dc.subject.otherPrice of anarchy
dc.subject.otherCoalitions
dc.titleFirefighting as a game
dc.typeArticle
dc.subject.lemacJocs, Teoria de
dc.contributor.groupUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. ALBCOM - Algorismia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-319-13123-8_9
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-13123-8_9
dc.rights.accessOpen Access
local.identifier.drac15583435
dc.description.versionPostprint (author’s final draft)
local.citation.authorAlvarez, C.; Blesa, M.; Molter, H.
local.citation.publicationNameLecture notes in computer science
local.citation.number8882
local.citation.startingPage108
local.citation.endingPage119


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