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dc.contributor.authorFreixas Bosch, Josep
dc.contributor.authorPons Navarro, Montserrat
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Projectes Arquitectònics
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-22T15:11:06Z
dc.date.available2015-09-01T00:31:19Z
dc.date.created2015-03-01
dc.date.issued2015-03-01
dc.identifier.citationFreixas, J.; Pons, M. An axiomatic characterization of the potential decisiveness index. "Journal of the Operational Research Society". 2015, vol. 66, n. 3, p. 353-359.
dc.identifier.issn0160-5682
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/27526
dc.descriptionThis is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of the Operational Research Society. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Freixas, J.; Pons, M. An axiomatic characterization of the potential decisiveness index. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2015, vol. 66, no. 3, p. 353-359 is available online at: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v66/n3/full/jors20145a.html
dc.description.abstractLet us consider that somebody is extremely interested in increasing the probability of a proposal to be approved by a certain committee and that to achieve this goal he/she is prepared to pay off one member of the committee. In a situation like this one, and assuming that vote-buying is allowed and free of stigma, which voter should be offered a bribe? The potential decisiveness index for simple games, which measures the effect that ensuring one positive vote produces for the probability of passing the issue at hand, is a good tool with which to acquire the answer. An axiomatic characterization of this index is given in this paper, and its relation to other classical power indices is shown.
dc.format.extent7 p.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject.lcshGame theory
dc.subject.lcshDecision making -- Mathematical models
dc.subject.lcshVoting -- Mathematical models
dc.subject.otherGame theory
dc.subject.otherPotential decisiveness index
dc.subject.otherMeasure for bribes
dc.subject.otherAxiomatization
dc.subject.otherStandard power indices
dc.subject.otherRelationship among several measures
dc.subject.otherOrdinal equivalence
dc.subject.otherVoting games
dc.subject.otherPower
dc.subject.otherSucess
dc.subject.otherVoters
dc.subject.otherValues
dc.subject.otherLucky
dc.titleAn axiomatic characterization of the potential decisiveness index
dc.typeArticle
dc.subject.lemacJocs, Teoria de
dc.subject.lemacDecisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject.lemacVot -- Models matemàtics
dc.contributor.groupUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.identifier.doi10.1057/jors.2014.5
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.rights.accessOpen Access
local.identifier.drac15561693
dc.description.versionPostprint (author’s final draft)
local.citation.authorFreixas, J.; Pons, M.
local.citation.publicationNameJournal of the Operational Research Society
local.citation.volume66
local.citation.number3
local.citation.startingPage353
local.citation.endingPage359


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