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dc.contributor.authorFreixas Bosch, Josep
dc.contributor.authorTchantcho, Bertrand
dc.contributor.authorTedjeugang, Narcisse
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-04T18:40:45Z
dc.date.available2014-12-05T16:44:39Z
dc.date.created2014-07-01
dc.date.issued2014-07-01
dc.identifier.citationFreixas, J.; Tchantcho, B.; Tedjeugang, N. Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention. "European journal of operational research", 01 Juliol 2014, vol. 236, núm. 1, p. 254-260.
dc.identifier.issn0377-2217
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/24930
dc.description.abstractIt is well known that he influence relation orders the voters the same way as the classical Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices do when they are extended to the voting games with abstention (VGA) in the class of complete games. Moreover, all hierarchies for the influence relation are achievable in the class of complete VGA. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we show that all hierarchies are achievable in a subclass of weighted VGA, the class of weighted games for which a single weight is assigned to voters. Secondly, we conduct a partial study of achievable hierarchies within the subclass of H-complete games, that is, complete games under stronger versions of influence relation. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.format.extent7 p.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject.lcshDecision making--Mathematical models
dc.subject.lcshVoting--Mathematical models
dc.subject.lcshVoting - Abstention
dc.subject.lcshHierarchies
dc.subject.otherGame theory
dc.subject.other(3
dc.subject.other2) Voting rules
dc.subject.otherAbstention
dc.subject.otherDecision support systems
dc.subject.otherWeightedness and completeness
dc.subject.otherHierarchies
dc.subject.otherOrdinal equivalence
dc.subject.otherPower
dc.subject.otherAapproval
dc.subject.otherSystems
dc.subject.otherBanzhaf
dc.subject.otherOutput
dc.subject.otherInput
dc.titleAchievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
dc.typeArticle
dc.subject.lemacDecisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject.lemacVot -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject.lemacAbstencionisme electoral
dc.contributor.groupUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ejor.2013.11.030
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::05 Combinatorics::05C Graph theory
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::94 Information And Communication, Circuits::94C Circuits, networks
dc.rights.accessOpen Access
drac.iddocument14576340
dc.description.versionPostprint (author’s final draft)
upcommons.citation.authorFreixas, J.; Tchantcho, B.; Tedjeugang, N.
upcommons.citation.publishedtrue
upcommons.citation.publicationNameEuropean journal of operational research
upcommons.citation.volume236
upcommons.citation.number1
upcommons.citation.startingPage254
upcommons.citation.endingPage260


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