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On the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic search games
dc.contributor.author | Álvarez Faura, M. del Carme |
dc.contributor.author | Duch Brown, Amalia |
dc.contributor.author | Serna Iglesias, María José |
dc.contributor.author | Thilikos Touloupas, Dimitrios |
dc.contributor.other | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Ciències de la Computació |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-09-08T11:01:23Z |
dc.date.available | 2014-09-08T11:01:23Z |
dc.date.created | 2011 |
dc.date.issued | 2011 |
dc.identifier.citation | Álvarez, C. [et al.]. On the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic search games. A: Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing. "TGC 2011: 6th International Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing: Aachen, Germany, September 9-10, 2011: pre-proceedings". Aachen: 2011, p. 57-71. |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2117/23999 |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a general multi-agent framework in which a set of n agents are roaming a network where m valuable and sharable goods (resources, services, information ....) are hidden in m different vertices of the network. We analyze several strategic situations that arise in this setting by means of game theory. To do so, we introduce a class of strategic games that we call strategic search games. In those games agents have to select a simple path in the network that starts from a predetermined set of initial vertices. Depending on how the value of the retrieved goods is splitted among the agents, we consider two game types: finders-share in which the agents that find a good split among them the corresponding benefit and firsts-share in which only the agents that first find a good share the corresponding benefit. We show that finders-share games always have pure Nash equilibria (pne ). For obtaining this result, we introduce the notion of Nash-preserving reduction between strategic games. We show that finders-share games are Nash-reducible to single-source network congestion games. This is done through a series of Nash-preserving reductions. For firsts-share games we show the existence of games with and without pne. Furthermore, we identify some graph families in which the firsts-share game has always a pne that is computable in polynomial time. |
dc.format.extent | 15 p. |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.subject | Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica::Intel·ligència artificial |
dc.subject.lcsh | Machine learning |
dc.subject.lcsh | Game theory |
dc.subject.lcsh | Multiagent systems |
dc.subject.other | Nash equilibria existence |
dc.subject.other | Strategic search games |
dc.subject.other | General multiagent framework |
dc.title | On the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic search games |
dc.type | Conference report |
dc.subject.lemac | Aprenentatge automàtic |
dc.subject.lemac | Jocs, Teoria de |
dc.subject.lemac | Sistemes multiagent |
dc.contributor.group | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. ALBCOM - Algorismia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed |
dc.rights.access | Open Access |
local.identifier.drac | 5979068 |
dc.description.version | Postprint (author’s final draft) |
local.citation.author | Álvarez, C.; Duch, A.; Serna, M.; Thilikos, D. |
local.citation.contributor | Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing |
local.citation.pubplace | Aachen |
local.citation.publicationName | TGC 2011: 6th International Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing: Aachen, Germany, September 9-10, 2011: pre-proceedings |
local.citation.startingPage | 57 |
local.citation.endingPage | 71 |