Lattice-Based proof of a shuffle
Document typeConference report
Rights accessOpen Access
In this paper we present the first fully post-quantum proof of a shuffle for RLWE encryption schemes. Shuffles are commonly used to construct mixing networks (mix-nets), a key element to ensure anonymity in many applications such as electronic voting systems. They should preserve anonymity even against an attack using quantum computers in order to guarantee long-term privacy. The proof presented in this paper is built over RLWE commitments which are perfectly binding and computationally hiding under the RLWE assumption, thus achieving security in a post-quantum scenario. Furthermore we provide a new definition for a secure mixing node (mix-node) and prove that our construction satisfies this definition.
CitationCosta, N.; Martinez, R.; Morillo, M. Lattice-Based proof of a shuffle. A: Financial Cryptography and Data Security. "FC 2019 International Workshops, VOTING and WTSC, St. Kitts, St. Kitts and Nevis, February 18–22, 2019, Revised Selected Papers". 2019, p. 330-346.
DLInternational Financial Cryptography Association 2020