Isogeny-based post-quantum key exchange protocols
Tutor / directorVillar Santos, Jorge Luis
Document typeBachelor thesis
Rights accessOpen Access
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The goal of this project is to understand and analyze the supersingular isogeny Diffie Hellman (SIDH), a post-quantum key exchange protocol which security lies on the isogeny-finding problem between supersingular elliptic curves. In order to do so, we first introduce the reader to cryptography focusing on key agreement protocols and motivate the rise of post-quantum cryptography as a necessity with the existence of the model of quantum computation. We review some of the known attacks on the SIDH and finally study some algorithmic aspects to understand how the protocol can be implemented.
DegreeGRAU EN MATEMÀTIQUES (Pla 2009)