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dc.contributor.authorBlasco Ruiz, Joan
dc.contributor.authorMolinero Albareda, Xavier
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-14T09:13:26Z
dc.date.issued2020-02
dc.identifier.citationBlasco, J.; Molinero, X. Games with multiple alternatives applied to voting systems. A: "Decision economics: complexity of decisions and decisions for complexity". Berlín: Springer, 2020, p. 117-124.
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-030-38226-1
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/177708
dc.description.abstractWe describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary organizations. These mechanisms are base on the so-called power indices of simple games with alternatives. The classical power indices applied to simple games just consider two options, yes/agree or not/reject. Here we also consider the abstention option, whose condition is allowed in most voting rules. In fact, we consider the extended Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices to measure the power of the player/voter or the coalition in real voting systems.
dc.format.extent8 p.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject.lcshGame theory
dc.subject.lcshVoting -- Mathematical models
dc.subject.otherSimple games
dc.subject.otherPower indices with mutiple alternative
dc.subject.otherVoting systems
dc.titleGames with multiple alternatives applied to voting systems
dc.typePart of book or chapter of book
dc.subject.lemacJocs, Teoria de
dc.subject.lemacVot -- Models matemàtics
dc.contributor.groupUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-38227-8_14
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030382261
dc.rights.accessRestricted access - publisher's policy
local.identifier.drac26707532
dc.description.versionPostprint (author's final draft)
dc.date.lift10000-01-01
local.citation.authorBlasco, J.; Molinero, X.
local.citation.pubplaceBerlín
local.citation.publicationNameDecision economics: complexity of decisions and decisions for complexity
local.citation.startingPage117
local.citation.endingPage124


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