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A mechanism design framework for hiring experts in e-healthcare

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hdl:2117/171176
Document typeArticle
Defense date2020
Rights accessOpen Access
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Abstract
We investigate the problem of hiring experts (motivated socially and monetarily) from outside of the hospital(s) in e-healthcare through the lens of mechanism design with and without money. This paper presents the mechanisms that handle the following scenarios: 1) Multiple patients and multiple experts with patients having zero budget, 2) Single or multiple patients and multiple experts with patient(s) having some positive budget. In this paper, for the first scenario, we have proposed algorithms based on the theory of mechanism design without money that satisfies several economic properties such as truthfulness, pareto optimality, and core allocation. Considering the second scenario, the truthful and budget feasible mechanisms are proposed. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanisms
CitationKumar, V.; Mukhopadhyay, S.; Xhafa, F. A mechanism design framework for hiring experts in e-healthcare. "Enterprise information systems", 2020. Vol. 14, num. 7, p. 932-982
ISSN1751-7575
Publisher versionhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17517575.2019.1604999
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