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dc.contributor.authorPutra, Andi Manggala
dc.contributor.authorPagalung, Gagaring
dc.contributor.authorHabbe, Abdul Hamid
dc.coverage.spatialeast=113.92132700000002; north=-0.789275; name=Indonèsia
dc.coverage.spatialeast=101.97576600000002; north=4.210483999999999; name=Malàisia
dc.coverage.spatialeast=121.77401699999996; north=12.879721; name=Filipines
dc.coverage.spatialeast=103.81983600000001; north=1.352083; name=Singapur
dc.coverage.spatialeast=100.99254100000007; north=15.870032; name=Tailàndia
dc.coverage.spatialeast=108.277199; north=14.058324; name=Vietnam
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-16T12:51:59Z
dc.date.available2019-01-16T12:51:59Z
dc.date.issued2018-12
dc.identifier.citationPutra, A. M.; Pagalung, G.; Habbe, A. H. Culture and corruption-driven agency costs and earnings management: evidence from south east Asian countries. "Intangible Capital", Desembre 2018, vol. 14, núm. 4, p. 499-517.
dc.identifier.issn1697-9818
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/126957
dc.description.abstractPurpose: This study scrutinises the correlation between earnings quality and agency cost based on corruption level and cultural values in six South-East Asian (SEA) countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Design/methodology: We restrict categorisation of each SEA country whether they have low or high agency cost. This study employs 581 firm-years observations from the 30 biggest market capitalisation firms of six SEA countries. We run multiple regressions of three main accrual models for main analysis (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999) to get discretionary accruals. Findings: Results show that firms in low agency cost countries have lower earnings quality, and indicate that earnings management behaviour in this study is efficient rather than detrimental. Furthermore, results present that firms with bigger size engage less in earnings management conduct compared to their counterparts. Originality/value: This study provides broader acknowledgement of how cultural values and corruption and their assumed correlation to agency cost could affect earnings management behaviour in South East Asia. We use a single proxy of high/low agency cost based on national cultural and corruption index.
dc.format.extent19 p.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherOmniaScience
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Economia i organització d'empreses::Economia regional
dc.subject.lcshSoutheast Asia -- Economic conditions
dc.subject.lcshSocial values -- Southeast Asia
dc.subject.lcshPublic administration - Corrupt practices -- Southeast Asia
dc.subject.otherCultural values
dc.subject.otherCorruption level
dc.subject.otherEarnings management
dc.subject.otherSouth East Asia
dc.titleCulture and corruption-driven agency costs and earnings management: evidence from south east Asian countries
dc.title.alternativeLevel of agency cost driven by cultural and corruption and earnings management: evidence of South East Asia countries
dc.typeArticle
dc.subject.lemacSud-est Asiàtic -- Condicions econòmiques
dc.subject.lemacValors socials -- Sud-est Asiàtic
dc.subject.lemacCorrupció administrativa -- Sud-est Asiàtic
dc.identifier.doi10.3926/ic.1289
dc.identifier.dlB-33375-2004
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.rights.accessOpen Access
local.citation.publicationNameIntangible Capital
local.citation.volume14
local.citation.number4
local.citation.startingPage499
local.citation.endingPage517


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