A game theoretic trust model for on-line distributed evolution of cooperation in MANETs
a-game-theoretic.pdf (556,9Kb) (Restricted access) Request copy
Què és aquest botó?
Aquest botó permet demanar una còpia d'un document restringit a l'autor. Es mostra quan:
- Disposem del correu electrònic de l'autor
- El document té una mida inferior a 20 Mb
- Es tracta d'un document d'accés restringit per decisió de l'autor o d'un document d'accés restringit per política de l'editorial
Rights accessRestricted access - publisher's policy
Cooperation among nodes is fundamental for the operation of mobile ad hoc networks(MANETs). In such networks, there could be selfish nodes that use resources from other nodes to send their packets but that do not offer their resources to forward packets for other nodes.Thus,a cooperation enforcement mechanism is necessary. Trust models have been proposed as mechanisms to incentive cooperation in MANET sand some of them are based on game theory concepts. Among game theoretic trust models, those that make nodes’ strategies evolve genetically have shown promising results for cooperation improvement. However,current approaches propose a highly centralized genetic evolution which render them unfeasible for practical purposes in MANETs. In this article, we propose a trust model based on a non-cooperative game that uses a bacterial-like algorithm to let the nodes quickly learn the appropriate cooperation behavior. Our model is completely distributed, achieves optimal cooperation values in a small fraction of time compared with centralized algorithms,and adapts effectively to environmental changes.
CitationMejía, M. [et al.]. A game theoretic trust model for on-line distributed evolution of cooperation in MANETs. "Journal of network and computer applications", 13 Gener 2011, vol. 1, núm. 34, p. 39-51.
All rights reserved. This work is protected by the corresponding intellectual and industrial property rights. Without prejudice to any existing legal exemptions, reproduction, distribution, public communication or transformation of this work are prohibited without permission of the copyright holder