Efficient multi-unit procurement mechanism with supply disruption risk
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In this paper, we study the multi-attribute multi-unit procurement mechanism design problem facing a set of potential suppliers who suffer from disruption risks. Each supplier's production cost depends on its disruption probability, and both are private information. We propose a Vickery-Clark-Groves auction with disruption risk (VCG-DR) for this problem and show that the mechanism is incentive-compatible, individual-rational and social efficient. Moreover, we compare the performance of the proposed mechanism and the popular single-attribute multi-unit forward auction (SA-MFV) with reserved attribute by numerical experiments. The results show that VCG-DR outperforms SA-MFV in both social efficiency and optimality.
CitationXiang, J., Zhang, J., Sallan, J. Efficient multi-unit procurement mechanism with supply disruption risk. "Journal of interdisciplinary mathematics", 18 Juliol 2018, vol. 21, núm. 4, p. 883-895.
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