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dc.contributor.authorMolinero Albareda, Xavier
dc.contributor.authorRiquelme Csori, Fabián
dc.contributor.authorSerna Iglesias, María José
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Ciències de la Computació
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-18T15:19:16Z
dc.date.issued2018-07
dc.identifier.citationMolinero, X., Riquelme, F., Serna, M. Satisfaction and power in unanimous majority influence decision models. "Electronic notes in discrete mathematics", Juliol 2018, vol. 68, p. 197-202.
dc.identifier.issn1571-0653
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/122635
dc.description.abstractWe consider decision models associated with cooperative influence games, the oblivious and the non-oblivious influence models. In those models the satisfaction and the power measures were introduced and studied. We analyze the computational complexity of those measures when the in uence level is set to unanimity and the rule of decision is simple majority. We show that computing the satisfaction and the power measure in those systems are #P-hard.
dc.format.extent6 p.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject.lcshDecision-making
dc.subject.lcshComputational complexity
dc.subject.otherDecision model
dc.subject.otherInfluence game
dc.subject.otherSatisfaction
dc.subject.otherPower
dc.subject.otherBanzhaf value
dc.titleSatisfaction and power in unanimous majority influence decision models
dc.typeArticle
dc.subject.lemacDecisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject.lemacComplexitat computacional
dc.contributor.groupUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.contributor.groupUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. ALBCOM - Algorismia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.endm.2018.06.034
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::33 Special functions::33F Computational aspects
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1571065318301252
dc.rights.accessRestricted access - publisher's policy
drac.iddocument23309936
dc.description.versionPostprint (author's final draft)
dc.relation.projectidinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/1PE/MTM2015-66818-P
dc.relation.projectidinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/TIN2017-86727-C2-1-R
dc.relation.projectidinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AGAUR/2017 SGR 786
dc.date.lift2020-07-17
upcommons.citation.authorMolinero, X., Riquelme, F., Serna, M.
upcommons.citation.publishedtrue
upcommons.citation.publicationNameElectronic notes in discrete mathematics
upcommons.citation.volume68
upcommons.citation.startingPage197
upcommons.citation.endingPage202


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