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Coalition formation and stability

dc.contributor.authorMagaña Nieto, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorCarreras Escobar, Francisco
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-13T07:46:58Z
dc.date.available2019-04-26T00:30:32Z
dc.date.issued2018-06
dc.identifier.citationMagaña, A., Carreras, F. Coalition formation and stability. "Group decision and negotiation", Juny 2018, vol. 27, núm. 3, p. 467-502.
dc.identifier.issn0926-2644
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/118049
dc.description.abstractThis paper aims to develop, for any cooperative game, a solution notion that enjoys stability and consists of a coalition structure and an associated payoff vector derived from the Shapley value. To this end, two concepts are combined: those of strong Nash equilibrium and Aumann--Dr\`{e}ze coalitional value. In particular, we are interested in conditions ensuring that the grand coalition is the best preference for all players. Monotonicity, convexity, cohesiveness and other conditions are used to provide several theoretical results that we apply to numerical examples including real--world economic situations.
dc.format.extent36 p.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject.lcshCooperative games (Mathematics)
dc.subject.lcshGame theory
dc.subject.otherGame theory
dc.subject.otherTU cooperative game
dc.subject.otherMonotonicity
dc.subject.otherSuperadditivity
dc.subject.otherConvexity
dc.subject.otherCohesiveness
dc.subject.otherShapley value
dc.subject.otherCoalition structure
dc.subject.otherAumann--Dr\`{e}ze value
dc.subject.otherStrong Nash equilibrium
dc.subject.otherStability
dc.titleCoalition formation and stability
dc.typeArticle
dc.subject.lemacJocs, Teoria de
dc.subject.lemacJocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.contributor.groupUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10726-018-9570-1
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10726-018-9570-1
dc.rights.accessOpen Access
local.identifier.drac22748754
dc.description.versionPostprint (author's final draft)
dc.relation.projectidinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//MTM2015-66818-P/ES/ASPECTOS MATEMATICOS, COMPUTACIONALES Y SOCIALES EN CONTEXTOS DE VOTACION Y DE COOPERACION./
local.citation.authorMagaña, A.; Carreras, F.
local.citation.publicationNameGroup decision and negotiation
local.citation.volume27
local.citation.number3
local.citation.startingPage467
local.citation.endingPage502


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