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dc.contributorMoll Echeto, Francisco de Borja
dc.contributor.authorCórdoba Pellicer, Santiago
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament d'Enginyeria Electrònica
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-01T11:50:23Z
dc.date.available2018-06-01T11:50:23Z
dc.date.issued2018-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/117730
dc.descriptionEmbedded security is nowadays a hot topic. With the arrival of Internet of Things and the increasing presence of embedded electronics in automotive systems, security has become an important factor in product design. This work is aimed to test the security capabilities of automotive electronic devices, using physical attacks such as fault injection and other side-channel techniques. Modern integrated circuits implement countermeasures to such attacks, but it has been proven that those countermeasures were designed with safety in mind, as automotive applications usually requi
dc.description.abstractEmbedded security is nowadays a hot topic. With the arrival of Internet of Things and the increasing demand of connectivity for embedded systems in many industrial markets, including automotive systems, security has become an important factor in product design. This thesis is aimed to test the security capabilities of automotive electronic devices, using physical attacks known as fault injection. Although other industries have been using countermeasures against physical attacks for decades, these are rarely used in automotive embedded systems. Automotive industry efforts have been focused in improving safety and reliability (e.g. ISO 26262 ASIL certification) instead of security. Previous research proved the risk of fault injection attacks on automotive SoCs, but these works were limited to small testing applications running on evaluation boards and not real automotive systems. The current work aims to assess the security of off-the-shelf automotive systems running real applications. More specifically, fault injection attacks are used to bypass the authentication mechanism of the Unified Diagnostic System (ISO 14229) present in two different commercial car dashboards. The findings are exposed in order to suggest design improvements and recommendations for a more secure automotive embedded systems and SoCs.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya
dc.rightsS'autoritza la difusió de l'obra mitjançant la llicència Creative Commons o similar 'Reconeixement-NoComercial- SenseObraDerivada'
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subjectÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Enginyeria electrònica
dc.subject.lcshAutomobiles -- Electronic equipment
dc.subject.otherFault injection
dc.subject.otherautomotive
dc.subject.otherECU
dc.subject.otherUDS
dc.subject.otherISO 14229
dc.subject.otherSecurity
dc.titleSecurity assessment for automotive controllers using side channel and fault injection attacks
dc.typeMaster thesis
dc.subject.lemacAutomòbils -- Equip electrònic
dc.identifier.slugETSETB-230.133239
dc.rights.accessOpen Access
dc.date.updated2018-02-14T06:51:21Z
dc.audience.educationlevelMàster
dc.audience.mediatorEscola Tècnica Superior d'Enginyeria de Telecomunicació de Barcelona


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