The social cost of congestion games by imposing variable delays
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hdl:2117/114795
Document typeArticle
Defense date2017-12-01
Rights accessOpen Access
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
ProjectMODELOS Y METODOS COMPUTACIONALES PARA DATOS MASIVOS ESTRUCTURADOS (MINECO-TIN2013-46181-C2-1-R)
Abstract
In this study, we describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism incurs no additional cost, in contrast to tolls that typically differ from the social cost as expressed in terms of delays.
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© <year>. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
CitationDiaz, J., Giotis, I., Kirousis, L., Mourtos, I., Serna, M. The social cost of congestion games by imposing variable delays. "ICT Express", 1 Desembre 2017, vol. 3, núm. 4, p. 155-159.
ISSN2405-9595
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