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dc.contributor.authorNikolov, Nicolai G.
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-02T09:18:01Z
dc.date.available2007-10-02T09:18:01Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.issn1134-5632
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2099/3615
dc.description.abstractThe Liar paradox, or the sentence "What I am now saying is false." and its various guises have been attracting the attention of logicians and linguists since ancient times. A commonly accepted treatment of the Liar paradox [7,8] is by means of Situation semantics, a powerful approach to natural language analysis. It is based on the machinery of non-well-founded sets developed in [1]. In this paper we show how to generalize these results including elements of fuzzy and intuitionistic fuzzy logic [3,4]. Basing on the results, a way is proposed towards solving the problem of modelling the two levels of Situation theory -- infons and propositions -- with a single one retaining the specific features of the two-levels logics.
dc.format.extent25-32
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Secció de Matemàtiques i Informàtica
dc.relation.ispartofMathware & soft computing . 2002 Vol. 9 Núm. 1
dc.rightsReconeixement-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 Espanya
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.otherLiar paradox
dc.subject.otherIntuitionistic fuzzy account
dc.subject.otherSituation theory
dc.titleA fuzzy and intuitionistic fuzzy account of the Liar paradox
dc.typeArticle
dc.subject.lemacLògica matemàtica
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::03 Mathematical logic and foundations::03B General logic
dc.rights.accessOpen Access


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