A fuzzy and intuitionistic fuzzy account of the Liar paradox

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hdl:2099/3615
Document typeArticle
Defense date2002
PublisherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Secció de Matemàtiques i Informàtica
Rights accessOpen Access
This work is protected by the corresponding intellectual and industrial property rights.
Except where otherwise noted, its contents are licensed under a Creative Commons license
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
Abstract
The Liar paradox, or the sentence
"What I am now saying is false." and its various guises have been attracting the attention of
logicians and linguists since ancient times.
A commonly accepted treatment of the Liar paradox [7,8] is by means of Situation semantics, a powerful approach
to natural language analysis. It is based on the machinery of
non-well-founded sets developed in [1]. In this paper we show
how to generalize these results including elements of fuzzy
and intuitionistic fuzzy logic [3,4]. Basing on the results, a way
is proposed towards solving the problem of modelling the two levels of
Situation theory -- infons and propositions -- with a single one
retaining the specific features of the two-levels logics.
ISSN1134-5632
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