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dc.contributor.authorSales Porta, Ton
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-03T08:55:52Z
dc.date.available2007-04-03T08:55:52Z
dc.date.issued1996
dc.identifier.issn1134-5632
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2099/2621
dc.description.abstractToday, Logic and Probability are mostly seen as independent fields with a separate history and set of foundations. Against this dominating perception, only a very few people (Laplace, Boole, Peirce) have suspected there was some affinity or relation between them. The truth is they have a considerable common ground which underlies the historical foundation of both disciplines and, in this century, has prompted notable thinkers as Reichenbach [14], Carnap [2] [3] or Popper [12] [13] (and Gaifman [5], Scott & Krauss [21], Fenstad [4], Miller [10] [11], David Lewis [9], Stalnaker [22], Hintikka [7] or Suppes [23]) to consider connection-building treatments of Logic and Probability as desirable. Indeed such a line of thinking can be pursued (this author, for one, attempted it in [15-19]). In so doing, one straightforwardly obtains a logic based on ---as the simple unifying concept--- an additive non-functional truth valuation which, though technically indistinguishable from (axiomatic) Probability, can however be totally ``decontaminated" from parasitical probabilistic interpretations (such as the usual readings of ``event", ``probability" or ``conditioning") and be given instead a strictly logical reading and justification (in terms of ``sentence", ``truth" or ``relativity"). Once some deeply-ingrained reading habits are overcome, the required concepts and formulas flow easily, and the resulting assertion-based sentential calculus becomes a very natural extension of ordinary two-valued reasoning. Furthermore, in the process we get: (a) intuitive geometrical and information-related interpretations of the concepts, (b) a simple theoretical explanation for some poorly justified formulas (intermittently advanced by various authors, some mentioned above),and (c) a semantics ---and a proof theory--- for general assertions that is unproblematically derived and also fully consistent with empirical or ad hoc approximate-reasoning ``Bayesian" formulas found by Artificial Intelligence researchers.
dc.format.extent11
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Secció de Matemàtiques i Informàtica
dc.relation.ispartofMathware & soft computing . 1996 Vol. 3 Núm. 1 [ -2 ]p.137-147
dc.rightsReconeixement-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 Espanya
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.otherSentential logic
dc.subject.otherBoolean algebra
dc.subject.otherLogical semantics
dc.subject.otherProbabilistic semantics
dc.subject.otherProbability logic
dc.subject.otherMany-valued logics
dc.subject.otherSupervaluation
dc.subject.otherUncertainty
dc.subject.otherRational belief
dc.subject.otherProof theory
dc.title(Pure) logic out of probability
dc.typeArticle
dc.subject.lemacLògica matemàtica
dc.subject.lemacProbabilitats
dc.subject.amsClassificació AMS::03 Mathematical logic and foundations::03B General logic
dc.rights.accessOpen Access


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