GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/3429
Wed, 21 Mar 2018 22:52:47 GMT2018-03-21T22:52:47ZSemivalues: weighting coefficients and allocations on unanimity games
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/114949
Semivalues: weighting coefficients and allocations on unanimity games
Domènech Blázquez, Margarita; Giménez Pradales, José Miguel; Puente del Campo, María Albina
Each semivalue, as a solution concept defined on cooperative games with a finite set of players, is univocally determined by weighting coefficients that apply to players’ marginal contributions. Taking into account that a semivalue induces semivalues on lower cardinalities, we prove that its weighting coefficients can be reconstructed from the last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues. Moreover, we provide the conditions of a sequence of numbers in order to be the family of the last coefficients of any induced semivalues. As a consequence of this fact, we give two characterizations of each semivalue defined on cooperative games with a finite set of players: one, among all semivalues; another, among all solution concepts on cooperative games.
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in [insert journal title]. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11590-017-1224-8.
Thu, 08 Mar 2018 16:59:05 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1149492018-03-08T16:59:05ZDomènech Blázquez, MargaritaGiménez Pradales, José MiguelPuente del Campo, María AlbinaEach semivalue, as a solution concept defined on cooperative games with a finite set of players, is univocally determined by weighting coefficients that apply to players’ marginal contributions. Taking into account that a semivalue induces semivalues on lower cardinalities, we prove that its weighting coefficients can be reconstructed from the last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues. Moreover, we provide the conditions of a sequence of numbers in order to be the family of the last coefficients of any induced semivalues. As a consequence of this fact, we give two characterizations of each semivalue defined on cooperative games with a finite set of players: one, among all semivalues; another, among all solution concepts on cooperative games.On the existence and uniqueness in phase-lag thermoelasticity
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/114238
On the existence and uniqueness in phase-lag thermoelasticity
Magaña Nieto, Antonio; Quintanilla de Latorre, Ramón
This paper is devoted to analyze the phaselag thermoelasticity problem. We study two different cases and we prove, for each one of them, that the
solutions of the problem are determined by a quasicontractive semigroup. As a consequence, existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence of the solutions are obtained
Mon, 19 Feb 2018 13:26:46 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1142382018-02-19T13:26:46ZMagaña Nieto, AntonioQuintanilla de Latorre, RamónThis paper is devoted to analyze the phaselag thermoelasticity problem. We study two different cases and we prove, for each one of them, that the
solutions of the problem are determined by a quasicontractive semigroup. As a consequence, existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence of the solutions are obtainedPreorders in simple games
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/113429
Preorders in simple games
Freixas Bosch, Josep; Pons Vallès, Montserrat
Any power index defines a total preorder in a simple game and, thus, induces a hierarchy among its players. The desirability relation, which is also a preorder, induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on linear games, i.e., games in which the desirability relation is total. The desirability relation is a sub–preorder of another preorder, the weak desirability relation, and the class of weakly linear games, i.e., games for which the weak desirability relation is total, is larger than the class of linear games. The weak desirability relation induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on weakly linear games. In this paper, we define a chain of preorders between the desirability and the weak desirability preorders. From them we obtain new classes of totally preordered games between linear and weakly linear games.
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_5.
Wed, 31 Jan 2018 10:31:34 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1134292018-01-31T10:31:34ZFreixas Bosch, JosepPons Vallès, MontserratAny power index defines a total preorder in a simple game and, thus, induces a hierarchy among its players. The desirability relation, which is also a preorder, induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on linear games, i.e., games in which the desirability relation is total. The desirability relation is a sub–preorder of another preorder, the weak desirability relation, and the class of weakly linear games, i.e., games for which the weak desirability relation is total, is larger than the class of linear games. The weak desirability relation induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on weakly linear games. In this paper, we define a chain of preorders between the desirability and the weak desirability preorders. From them we obtain new classes of totally preordered games between linear and weakly linear games.A note on multinomial probabilistic values
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/111772
A note on multinomial probabilistic values
Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Puente del Campo, María Albina
Multinomial values were previously introduced by one of the authors in reliability and extended later to all cooperative games. Here, we present for this subfamily of probabilistic values three new results, previously stated only for binomial semivalues in the literature. They concern the dimension of the subspace spanned by the multinomial values and two characterizations: one, individual, for each multinomial value; another, collective, for the whole subfamily they form. Finally, an application to simple games is provided
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in "TOP". The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-017-0464-1
Tue, 12 Dec 2017 12:36:30 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1117722017-12-12T12:36:30ZCarreras Escobar, FranciscoPuente del Campo, María AlbinaMultinomial values were previously introduced by one of the authors in reliability and extended later to all cooperative games. Here, we present for this subfamily of probabilistic values three new results, previously stated only for binomial semivalues in the literature. They concern the dimension of the subspace spanned by the multinomial values and two characterizations: one, individual, for each multinomial value; another, collective, for the whole subfamily they form. Finally, an application to simple games is providedCentrality measure in social networks based on linear threshold model
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/111727
Centrality measure in social networks based on linear threshold model
Riquelme Csori, Fabián; Gonzalez Cantergiani, Pablo; Molinero Albareda, Xavier; Serna Iglesias, María José
Centrality and influence spread are two of the most studied concepts in social network analysis. In recent years, centrality measures have attracted the attention of many researchers, generating a large and varied number of new studies about social network analysis and its applications. However, as far as we know, traditional models of influence spread have not yet been exhaustively used to define centrality measures according to the influence criteria. Most of the considered work in this topic is based on the independent cascade model. In this paper we explore the possibilities of the linear threshold model for the definition of centrality measures to be used on weighted and labeled social networks. We propose a new centrality measure to rank the users of the network, the Linear Threshold Rank (LTR), and a centralization measure to determine to what extent the entire network has a centralized structure, the Linear Threshold Centralization (LTC). We appraise the viability of the approach through several case studies. We consider four different social networks to compare our new measures with two centrality measures based on relevance criteria and another centrality measure based on the independent cascade model. Our results show that our measures are useful for ranking actors and networks in a distinguishable way.
Mon, 11 Dec 2017 16:58:45 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1117272017-12-11T16:58:45ZRiquelme Csori, FabiánGonzalez Cantergiani, PabloMolinero Albareda, XavierSerna Iglesias, María JoséCentrality and influence spread are two of the most studied concepts in social network analysis. In recent years, centrality measures have attracted the attention of many researchers, generating a large and varied number of new studies about social network analysis and its applications. However, as far as we know, traditional models of influence spread have not yet been exhaustively used to define centrality measures according to the influence criteria. Most of the considered work in this topic is based on the independent cascade model. In this paper we explore the possibilities of the linear threshold model for the definition of centrality measures to be used on weighted and labeled social networks. We propose a new centrality measure to rank the users of the network, the Linear Threshold Rank (LTR), and a centralization measure to determine to what extent the entire network has a centralized structure, the Linear Threshold Centralization (LTC). We appraise the viability of the approach through several case studies. We consider four different social networks to compare our new measures with two centrality measures based on relevance criteria and another centrality measure based on the independent cascade model. Our results show that our measures are useful for ranking actors and networks in a distinguishable way.On the viscoelastic mixtures of solids
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/108907
On the viscoelastic mixtures of solids
Fernández, Jose R.; Magaña Nieto, Antonio; Masid, Maria; Quintanilla de Latorre, Ramón
In this paper we analyze an homogeneous and isotropic mixture of viscoelastic solids. We propose conditions to guarantee the coercivity of the internal energy and also of the dissipation, first in dimension two and later in dimension three. We obtain an uniqueness result for the solutions when the dissipation is positive and without any hypothesis over the internal energy. When the internal energy and the dissipation are both positive, we prove the existence of solutions as well as their analyticity. Exponential stability and impossibility of localization of the solutions are immediate consequences.
The final publication is available at link.springer.com via https://doi.org/10.1007/s00245-017-9439-8
Fri, 20 Oct 2017 10:49:05 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1089072017-10-20T10:49:05ZFernández, Jose R.Magaña Nieto, AntonioMasid, MariaQuintanilla de Latorre, RamónIn this paper we analyze an homogeneous and isotropic mixture of viscoelastic solids. We propose conditions to guarantee the coercivity of the internal energy and also of the dissipation, first in dimension two and later in dimension three. We obtain an uniqueness result for the solutions when the dissipation is positive and without any hypothesis over the internal energy. When the internal energy and the dissipation are both positive, we prove the existence of solutions as well as their analyticity. Exponential stability and impossibility of localization of the solutions are immediate consequences.Combinatorial structures to modeling simple games and applications
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/107881
Combinatorial structures to modeling simple games and applications
Molinero Albareda, Xavier
We connect three different topics: combinatorial structures, game theory and chemistry. In particular, we establish the bases to represent some simple games, defined as influence games, and molecules, defined from atoms, by using combinatorial structures. First, we characterize simple games as influence games using influence graphs. It let us to modeling simple games as combinatorial structures (from the viewpoint of structures or graphs). Second, we formally define molecules as combinations of atoms. It let us to modeling molecules as combinatorial structures (from the viewpoint of combinations). It is open to generate such combinatorial structures using some specific techniques as genetic algorithms, (meta-)heuristics algorithms and parallel programming, among others.
Thu, 21 Sep 2017 15:31:46 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1078812017-09-21T15:31:46ZMolinero Albareda, XavierWe connect three different topics: combinatorial structures, game theory and chemistry. In particular, we establish the bases to represent some simple games, defined as influence games, and molecules, defined from atoms, by using combinatorial structures. First, we characterize simple games as influence games using influence graphs. It let us to modeling simple games as combinatorial structures (from the viewpoint of structures or graphs). Second, we formally define molecules as combinations of atoms. It let us to modeling molecules as combinatorial structures (from the viewpoint of combinations). It is open to generate such combinatorial structures using some specific techniques as genetic algorithms, (meta-)heuristics algorithms and parallel programming, among others.On the characterization of weighted simple games
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/107644
On the characterization of weighted simple games
Freixas Bosch, Josep; Freixas Boleda, Marc; Kurz, Sascha
This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main purposes in both theories is to determine when a simple game is representable as a weighted game, which allows a very compact and easily comprehensible representation. Deep results were found in threshold logic in the sixties and seventies for this problem. However, game theory has taken the lead and some new results have been obtained for the problem in the past two decades. The second and main goal of this paper is to provide some new results on this problem and propose several open questions and conjectures for future research. The results we obtain depend on two significant parameters of the game: the number of types of equivalent players and the number of types of shift-minimal winning coalitions.
The final publication is available at link.springer.com via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9606-z
Thu, 14 Sep 2017 17:51:00 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1076442017-09-14T17:51:00ZFreixas Bosch, JosepFreixas Boleda, MarcKurz, SaschaThis paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main purposes in both theories is to determine when a simple game is representable as a weighted game, which allows a very compact and easily comprehensible representation. Deep results were found in threshold logic in the sixties and seventies for this problem. However, game theory has taken the lead and some new results have been obtained for the problem in the past two decades. The second and main goal of this paper is to provide some new results on this problem and propose several open questions and conjectures for future research. The results we obtain depend on two significant parameters of the game: the number of types of equivalent players and the number of types of shift-minimal winning coalitions.Separability by semivalues modified for games with coalition structure
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/105390
Separability by semivalues modified for games with coalition structure
Amer Ramon, Rafael; Giménez Pradales, José Miguel
Two games are inseparable by semivalues if both games obtain the same allocation whatever semivalue is considered. The problem of separability by semivalues reduces to separability from the null game. For four or more players, the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game by semivalues contains games different to zero-game. Now, for five or more players, the consideration of a priori coalition blocks in the player set allows us to reduce in a significant way the dimension of the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game. For these subspaces we provide basis formed by games of a particular type.
The original publication is available at www.rairo-ro.org
Tue, 13 Jun 2017 15:21:57 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1053902017-06-13T15:21:57ZAmer Ramon, RafaelGiménez Pradales, José MiguelTwo games are inseparable by semivalues if both games obtain the same allocation whatever semivalue is considered. The problem of separability by semivalues reduces to separability from the null game. For four or more players, the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game by semivalues contains games different to zero-game. Now, for five or more players, the consideration of a priori coalition blocks in the player set allows us to reduce in a significant way the dimension of the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game. For these subspaces we provide basis formed by games of a particular type.Using the multilinear extension to study some probabilistic power indices
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/104580
Using the multilinear extension to study some probabilistic power indices
Freixas Bosch, Josep; Pons Vallès, Montserrat
We consider binary voting systems modeled by a simple game, in which voters vote independently of each other, and the probability distribution over coalitions is known. The Owen’s multilinear extension of the simple game is used to improve the use and the computation of three indices defined in this model: the decisiveness index, which is an extension of the Banzhaf index, the success index, which is an extension of the Rae index, and the luckiness index. This approach leads us to prove new properties and inter-relations between these indices. In particular it is proved that the ordinal equivalence between success and decisiveness indices is achieved in any game if and only if the probability distribution is anonymous. In the anonymous case, the egalitarianism of the three indices is compared, and it is also proved that, for these distributions, decisiveness and success indices respect the strength of the seats, whereas luckiness reverses this order.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-016-9514-6
Wed, 17 May 2017 14:32:45 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1045802017-05-17T14:32:45ZFreixas Bosch, JosepPons Vallès, MontserratWe consider binary voting systems modeled by a simple game, in which voters vote independently of each other, and the probability distribution over coalitions is known. The Owen’s multilinear extension of the simple game is used to improve the use and the computation of three indices defined in this model: the decisiveness index, which is an extension of the Banzhaf index, the success index, which is an extension of the Rae index, and the luckiness index. This approach leads us to prove new properties and inter-relations between these indices. In particular it is proved that the ordinal equivalence between success and decisiveness indices is achieved in any game if and only if the probability distribution is anonymous. In the anonymous case, the egalitarianism of the three indices is compared, and it is also proved that, for these distributions, decisiveness and success indices respect the strength of the seats, whereas luckiness reverses this order.