Capítols de llibrehttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/34342020-01-17T19:37:33Z2020-01-17T19:37:33ZOn the exponential decay of solutions in dual-phase-lag porous thermoelasticityFernández, José RamónMagaña Nieto, AntonioQuintanilla de Latorre, Ramónhttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1678552019-12-19T06:27:07Z2019-09-02T11:34:22ZOn the exponential decay of solutions in dual-phase-lag porous thermoelasticity
Fernández, José Ramón; Magaña Nieto, Antonio; Quintanilla de Latorre, Ramón
In the last years, a big interest has been developed to understand the time decay of solutions for the porous thermoelasticity with different thermal mechanisms. We here want to consider the problem of the one-dimensional porous thermoelasticity when the heat conduction is given by means of the dual-phase-lag theory. We want to give suitable conditions in order to guarantee that the decay of solutions is controlled by a negative exponential. We also want to provide conditions for the slow decay of the solutions.
2019-09-02T11:34:22ZFernández, José RamónMagaña Nieto, AntonioQuintanilla de Latorre, RamónIn the last years, a big interest has been developed to understand the time decay of solutions for the porous thermoelasticity with different thermal mechanisms. We here want to consider the problem of the one-dimensional porous thermoelasticity when the heat conduction is given by means of the dual-phase-lag theory. We want to give suitable conditions in order to guarantee that the decay of solutions is controlled by a negative exponential. We also want to provide conditions for the slow decay of the solutions.An equivalent formulation for the Shapley valueFreixas Bosch, Josephttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1306422020-01-01T01:25:48Z2019-03-20T09:06:34ZAn equivalent formulation for the Shapley value
Freixas Bosch, Josep
An equivalent explicit formula for the Shapley value is provided, its equivalence with the classical one is proven by double induction. The importance of this new formula, in contrast to the classical one, is its capability of being extended to more general classes of games, in particular to j-cooperative games or multichoice games, in which players choose among different levels of participation in the game.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58464-4_1.
2019-03-20T09:06:34ZFreixas Bosch, JosepAn equivalent explicit formula for the Shapley value is provided, its equivalence with the classical one is proven by double induction. The importance of this new formula, in contrast to the classical one, is its capability of being extended to more general classes of games, in particular to j-cooperative games or multichoice games, in which players choose among different levels of participation in the game.Preorders in simple gamesFreixas Bosch, JosepPons Vallès, Montserrathttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1134292019-12-20T18:32:46Z2018-01-31T10:31:34ZPreorders in simple games
Freixas Bosch, Josep; Pons Vallès, Montserrat
Any power index defines a total preorder in a simple game and, thus, induces a hierarchy among its players. The desirability relation, which is also a preorder, induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on linear games, i.e., games in which the desirability relation is total. The desirability relation is a sub–preorder of another preorder, the weak desirability relation, and the class of weakly linear games, i.e., games for which the weak desirability relation is total, is larger than the class of linear games. The weak desirability relation induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on weakly linear games. In this paper, we define a chain of preorders between the desirability and the weak desirability preorders. From them we obtain new classes of totally preordered games between linear and weakly linear games.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_5.
2018-01-31T10:31:34ZFreixas Bosch, JosepPons Vallès, MontserratAny power index defines a total preorder in a simple game and, thus, induces a hierarchy among its players. The desirability relation, which is also a preorder, induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on linear games, i.e., games in which the desirability relation is total. The desirability relation is a sub–preorder of another preorder, the weak desirability relation, and the class of weakly linear games, i.e., games for which the weak desirability relation is total, is larger than the class of linear games. The weak desirability relation induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on weakly linear games. In this paper, we define a chain of preorders between the desirability and the weak desirability preorders. From them we obtain new classes of totally preordered games between linear and weakly linear games.On the characterization of weighted simple gamesFreixas Bosch, JosepFreixas Boleda, MarcKurz, Saschahttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/1076442019-12-20T18:32:42Z2017-09-14T17:51:00ZOn the characterization of weighted simple games
Freixas Bosch, Josep; Freixas Boleda, Marc; Kurz, Sascha
This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main purposes in both theories is to determine when a simple game is representable as a weighted game, which allows a very compact and easily comprehensible representation. Deep results were found in threshold logic in the sixties and seventies for this problem. However, game theory has taken the lead and some new results have been obtained for the problem in the past two decades. The second and main goal of this paper is to provide some new results on this problem and propose several open questions and conjectures for future research. The results we obtain depend on two significant parameters of the game: the number of types of equivalent players and the number of types of shift-minimal winning coalitions.
The final publication is available at link.springer.com via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9606-z
2017-09-14T17:51:00ZFreixas Bosch, JosepFreixas Boleda, MarcKurz, SaschaThis paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main purposes in both theories is to determine when a simple game is representable as a weighted game, which allows a very compact and easily comprehensible representation. Deep results were found in threshold logic in the sixties and seventies for this problem. However, game theory has taken the lead and some new results have been obtained for the problem in the past two decades. The second and main goal of this paper is to provide some new results on this problem and propose several open questions and conjectures for future research. The results we obtain depend on two significant parameters of the game: the number of types of equivalent players and the number of types of shift-minimal winning coalitions.Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley ruleCarreras Escobar, FranciscoOwen Salazar, Guillermohttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/232502019-12-19T06:45:14Z2014-06-17T13:52:14ZPure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo
The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. the book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publication
2014-06-17T13:52:14ZCarreras Escobar, FranciscoOwen Salazar, GuillermoThe developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. the book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publicationPower, cooperation indices and coalition structuresAmer Ramon, RafaelCarreras Escobar, Franciscohttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/232342019-12-19T06:23:03Z2014-06-16T15:20:46ZPower, cooperation indices and coalition structures
Amer Ramon, Rafael; Carreras Escobar, Francisco
The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. the book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publication
2014-06-16T15:20:46ZAmer Ramon, RafaelCarreras Escobar, FranciscoThe developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well. the book revisits the themes discussed in the well-known 1982 publicationOn the notion of dimension and codimension of simple gamesFreixas Bosch, JosepMarciniak, Dorotahttp://hdl.handle.net/2117/117222019-12-19T05:32:30Z2011-03-08T16:04:26ZOn the notion of dimension and codimension of simple games
Freixas Bosch, Josep; Marciniak, Dorota
2011-03-08T16:04:26ZFreixas Bosch, JosepMarciniak, Dorota