Electric motorcycles and scooters are rapidly gaining traction in urban environments, driven by the growing demand for cleaner and more efficient transportation solutions. Similar to modern automobiles, these two-wheelers rely extensively on digital technologies to manage critical functions via internal communication networks, most notably the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. This bus links essential Electronic Control Units (ECUs) responsible for core operations such as braking, motor control, and battery management. While this integration significantly improves vehicle performance, efficiency, and user experience, it also introduces notable security vulnerabilities. The CAN bus’s open, broadcast communication model makes it especially susceptible to cyberattacks, including message injection, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and unauthorized remote access. This document delivers a comprehensive examination of cybersecurity risks linked to the CAN bus within electric motorcycles and scooters. It investigates primary attack vectors, encompassing both physical intrusions and remote exploits through wireless communication channels such as Bluetooth and cellular networks. Furthermore, the study scrutinizes the structural limitations of the CAN protocol, emphasizing the lack of built-in authentication mechanisms that facilitate arbitrary message injection and ECU compromise. An experimental component presents an in-depth security assessment of a real-world electric motorcycle prototype. By leveraging insights from industry collaborations and detailed prototype documentation, the analysis is continuously refined to accurately identify existing attack vectors, evaluate implemented security controls, and assess the overall system architecture for vulnerabilities. To complement this, a survey was conducted to gauge industry perspectives and attitudes regarding the cybersecurity of electric motorcycles, providing valuable context and guiding the research focus. Drawing from these findings, the thesis proposes targeted mitigation strategies designed to strengthen the security posture of the prototype. Building on this foundation, the research outlines potential defense mechanisms and addresses the practical constraints involved in deploying these solutions within the limited-resource environments typical of two-wheeled electric vehicles. Finally, the thesis discusses broader implications for vehicle security architectures, advocating for resilient, zero-trust network models that effectively address the unique cybersecurity challenges facing this fast-growing sector.