Now showing items 1-7 of 7

    • A new coalitional value 

      Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Alonso Meijide, José María (2009-10-17)
      External research report
      Restricted access - author's decision
      We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The resulting coalitional value is a twofold extension of the Shapley value in the following sense: (1) the amount obtained by ...
    • A new power index based on minimal winning coalitions 

      Freixas Bosch, Josep; Alonso Meijide, José María (2009)
      External research report
      Restricted access - author's decision
      Nou índex de poder basat en coalicions shift-minimals
    • A new power index based on minimal winning coalitions without any surplus 

      Alonso Meijide, José María; Freixas Bosch, Josep (2010-04)
      Article
      Restricted access - author's decision
      In this paper we propose a new power index useful for the evaluation of each member in a committee, or democratic institution, and the degree of influence over the voting decision making system. The proposed solution is ...
    • A proportional extension of the Shapley value for monotone games with a coalition structure 

      Alonso Meijide, José María; Carreras Escobar, Francisco (2009-03-06)
      External research report
      Restricted access - author's decision
      The Owen value is a modification of the Shapley value for games with a coalition structure. In this paper, we propose another modification of the Shapley value for monotone games with a coalition structure. This new value ...
    • Computation of several power indices by generating functions 

      Alonso Meijide, José María; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Molinero Albareda, Xavier (2012)
      Article
      Open Access
      In this paper we propose methods to compute the Deegan-Packel, the Public Good, and the Shift power indices by generating functions for the particular case of weighted voting games. Furthermore, we define a new power ...
    • The proportional coalitional Shapley value 

      Alonso Meijide, José María; Carreras Escobar, Francisco (2011-06)
      Article
      Restricted access - publisher's policy
      We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The resulting coalitional value is a twofold extension of the Shapley value in the following sense: (1) the amount obtained by ...
    • The proportional partitional Shapley value 

      Alonso Meijide, José María; Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Costa Bouzas, Julián; García Jurado, Ignacio (2015-05)
      Article
      Open Access
      A new coalitional value is proposed under the hypothesis of isolated unions. The main difference between this value and the Aumann–Drèze value is that the allocations within each union are not given by the Shapley value ...