We investigate binary voting systems with two types of voters and a hierarchy among the members in each type, so that members in one class have more influence or importance than members in the other class. The purpose ...

In this paper we propose a new power index useful for the evaluation of each member in a committee, or democratic institution, and the degree of influence over the voting decision making system. The proposed solution is ...

Many power indices on simple games have been defined trying to measure, under different points of view, the “a priori” importance of a voter in a collective binary voting scenario. A unified probabilistic way to define ...

It is well known that he influence relation orders the voters the same way as the classical Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices do when they are extended to the voting games with abstention (VGA) in the class of complete ...

The Banzhaf power index for games admits several extensions if the players have more than two ordered voting options. In this paper we prove that the most intu-itive and recognized extension ...

The aim of this work is to give a characterization of the Shapley–Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices for (3,2)-simple games. We generalize to the set of (3,2)-simple games the classical axioms for power indices on simple ...

Els jocs simples simètrics (3, 2) serveixen de models per a sistemes de votació anònims en els quals cada votant pot votar "sí", abstenir-se, o votar "no", el resultat és "sí" o "no", i els votants juguen papers intercanviables. ...

We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple games just consider parties, players or voters. Here, we also consider games with a priori unions, i.e., coalitions among ...

An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 ...

Many real-world voting systems consist of voters that occur in just two different types. Indeed, each voting system with a “House” and a “Senate” is of that type. Here we present structural characterizations and an explicit ...