

# Francoism and the triumph of home ownership, 1939-1975

The case of Nou Barris

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## Abstract

The various responses to the economic situation and the excruciating issue of housing during the long, unstable period of Franco's regime, during which there was high immigration and steep growth in large cities, led to the consolidation of high percentages of homeownership. Homeownership was particularly notable in the working-class suburbs of urban agglomerations. This was a real cultural mutation that, due to its divergence from European housing policies, is a good focus of analysis to explore some specific characteristics of the housing problem during the Franco regime. Through a literature review and the use of primary sources (building permits, building and housing censuses and population registers), the ongoing research on Barcelona questions whether the divergence from other European countries is mainly a Falangist cultural legacy, as suggested recently, or more closely related to the process of economic liberalisation. As greater access to homeownership coincided with a revolution in ways of living and new relations with the neighbourhood, it should also be questioned whether it influenced the high number of neighbourhood movements during the decline of Franco's regime.

## Keywords

Housing, homeownership, working-class suburbs, neighbourhood movements, Francoism, Falangism commonhold

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## ON THE TRACK OF HOMEOWNERSHIP CULTURE: THE STAGES OF THE SPANISH HOUSING CHALLENGE

It is common and useful to distinguish between two contrasting stages during the long period of the Franco regime. If we consider this period from the perspective of production, the turning point occurred in the mid-1950s. In the first stage, the context was one of an autarchic economic policy of brutal contraction in comparison to the previous decades. The second stage was one of great expansion between 1954 and 1974, with a real revolution in the production process and commercialisation.

However, if we consider the period from the perspective of consumption, that is, its impact on the majority of residents of the large cities, the main turning point occurred in 1960. Despite the increase in production, between 1954 and 1959 economic difficulties and strong migratory movements prevented a reduction in the deficits inherited from the previous stage. This is illustrated in the graph comparing authorised dwellings in Barcelona with the increase in number of inhabitants, which reveals a serious worsening of the situation during the final years of the 1950s (Fig. 1). A clear inflection in terms of demand can only be seen from 1960, due to slower population growth and the robust, sustained expansion in construction of new dwellings, with increasing involvement of private initiative. This is when the “developmentalism” stage began. Between 1960 and 1974, a real revolution occurred in the urban working class's ways of living and consuming. This stage marks the start of a complete transformation in their living culture that had long-term consequences. Housing conditions and the parameters of habitability changed radically.

In the process, high percentages of homeownership became consolidated and have characterised Spanish cities ever since. In an interesting recent book, José Candela Ochotorena discussed this issue and provided new perspectives. According to his calculations, in Spain in 1950 around 20% of urban housing was owned, while in 1960 this percentage had risen to 43% and in 1970 it stood at 70%<sup>1</sup>. In Barcelona, the change followed a similar pattern although at a later date. The percentage of homeownership in 1965 was 21.2% and in 1970 it was 31%. These percentages are particularly significant if they are compared with housing policy at this time in European countries, where a large amount of social housing for rent was built.

The central thesis of Candela's book is summed up in the subtitle: “la herencia cultural falangista de la vivienda en propiedad, 1939–1959” (The Falangist cultural legacy of homeownership, 1939–1959)<sup>2</sup>. Indeed, the two first decades of the Falange's system of ideological hegemony seem to have had a clear influence. The Protected Housing Act of 1939 clearly shows a desire to promote homeownership as a formula for social pacification and framing, as it is associated with the conservative, stable nature of the traditional home. Significantly, protected housing could not be transferred without the authorisation of the National Housing Institute (INV)<sup>3</sup>. The period clearly culminated with the creation of the new Ministry of Housing whose head from 1957 to 1960, the Falangist ideologist José Luis Arrese, created the slogan: “We want a country of proprietors, not proletarians”.




Fig. 1. Left: Rates of workers in industry, services, communication and transport, 1970.

Fig. 2. Right: Rates of property paid or with outstanding installments, 1970

However, we should question to what extent the divergence in housing policy from other European countries was essentially the result of the Falangist culture expounded in public speeches and political actions. Alternatively, it could have been the result of a set of circumstances and conflicting decisions associated with internal commitments and balances of families during the Franco regime, in which determining factors were the constant inflationist process and the rent freeze due to the Urban Rent Act of 1946. It does not seem coincidental that the Commonhold Property Act was approved in 1960. More than Falangist-inspired legislation, this act could be associated with the new programme of economic liberalisation. Consequently, the issue is a good focus of analysis to explore some complexities of the long path and the regime's limitations before the stubborn problem of housing.

## THE COLLAPSE IN HOUSING CONDITIONS AND DEMAND FOR HOMEOWNERSHIP, 1939–1959

Despite the triumphal speeches of Falangist leaders, in the large Spanish metropolises, the first decades of the post-war period were marked by hunger, poverty and a brutal drop in the overall housing conditions. The construction sector suffered years of paralysis and standstill. Housing policy depended on the Ministry of Labour, which used all its scarce resources to activate the economy and mitigate the severe situation of unemployment. The first Spanish National Housing Plan of 1944–1954 was supported by the Unemployment Act in a strongly inflationary context with a lack of materials, costs that were difficult to anticipate and severe financing problems. Accommodation for the working class did not appear to be a priority. The lack of dwellings for the middle class seemed more pressing, “as the comfort required in modern times and the anomalous market situation made con-

struction more expensive so that it was only accessible to those with considerable capital.”<sup>4</sup>

In fact, state resources and aid were concentrated through housing legislation for the middle classes<sup>5</sup>. The most significant laws were that of 1944, “against unemployment and on housing rebates” for rent and the decree of 1948 against unemployment that prioritised ownership for amortisation. This housing policy, which overlooked the “productive class”, and a failed economic policy led to an extremely critical situation for the weakest in society, which was considerably more serious than in the 1920s.

In response to price increases and the increasing gap between salaries and the cost of accommodation, the approval of the Urban Rent Act in 1946 led to a rent freeze. This reactive, circumstantial measure pushed up the price of new rents, penalised owners and discouraged new investment in the sector. The rent block and the inflation rates clearly aggravated the housing problem in the long term, as they undermined the rental option. The effect of this was to promote what is known as commonhold, which was already advancing in Zaragoza and Valencia and beginning to be introduced in Madrid. By 1945, an article proposed commonhold as a long-term alternative to mobilise private savings<sup>6</sup>.

The initiatives promoted by the Obra Sindical del Hogar (Syndical Housing Authority, OSH) or the Municipal Boards had almost no impact on alleviating the serious lack of affordable rental housing. Between 1942 and 1953, the OSH handed over 21,737 dwellings, but the 1952 Congress of Architects estimated optimistically that the shortfall was 800,000 dwellings.<sup>7</sup> During these years, the housing problem in the big cities was rapidly worsening. Migrations to urban centres had resumed as people fled conditions of poverty, repression, and lack of prospects in many rural areas. The bottleneck in supply gave rise to a new explosion in slum dwellings and cohabitation in particular. In addition, it fuelled a strong submarket of informal dwellings, in neighbourhoods where people bought very small plots of land and built on them illegally.

The constant deterioration in living conditions in a context of ineffectiveness, rationing and illegal trade triggered the greatest explosion in social unrest in the early phase of Franco's dictatorship. The inappropriately named tram strike of 1951 in Barcelona, which was really a boycott by users that became a full general strike despite the harsh repression, was a wake-up call for the regime. In the remodelling of the government in 1951, some new ministers were more inclined towards a degree of economic liberalisation, and in May 1952 rationing disappeared officially. In some way, this action recognised the failure of the autarchy. Studies on the housing problem in Spain pushed this issue into the foreground as the ‘main national problem’.<sup>8</sup>

In this context, the 1953 Urban Plan for Barcelona and its area of influence -known as *Pla Comarcal* (Barcelona County Plan)- was approved with the aim of intensifying urban activity and providing land to display new housing policies. This plan would allow the detailed development of partial masterplans, facilitating ordinances for the densification processes (mainly for the pre-consolidated urban fabric of the peripheral neighbourhoods of the city), and ordering areas for new residential estates. In the case of densification, the importance of planning was paramount, not only due to the modification of building ordinances, but also for the regulation of the mandatory nature of certain infrastructures and services, such as the water supply or the sewage network.




Fig. 3. Rates of paid property in working class townships in the metropolitan area of Barcelona, 1970

In 1954, within the framework of the Second Housing Plan, the new law on “limited rent” housing of 1954 offered tax credits and exemptions, priority supply of materials, subsidies and loans. The law completely redefined the official protection system, which shifted to private property development. Other liberalisation measures included the approval of the Land Act of 1956 that was designed to expand the offering of buildable land and the new Urban Rent Act of 1956 that partially unblocked rent prices. However, these measures were less effective.

And, finally, the remodelling of the Government of 1957 was crucial. Not only meant a decisive step for economic liberalization, but also meant the creation of the Ministry of Housing, promoter of large operations of massive housing through Emergency Plans. This ministry was led by José Luis Arrese, a Falangist who was absolutely loyal to Franco as a minister. His popular slogan “We want a country of proprietors, not proletarians” and the approval in 1960 of the Commonhold Property Act appear to be the culmination of the Falangist influence on housing policy, as stated by J. Candela. However, the twenty previous years of Falangist interventionist policy contradict this interpretation. All demands for commonhold planning, transmitted from at least 1945 through the press and through Chambers of Urban Property, were ignored. The inaction is surprising if we consider the official intention of mobilising middle-class savings to activate the economy and alleviate unemployment. It is also surprising if we consider the experience in Peron’s regime, which was so similar to the early phase of Franco’s dictatorship. In Argentina, the inflationary process also led to a rent freeze in 1943. In the response of Peron’s regime to the severe housing problem, which included social housing plans and mortgage loans, the approval of the Commonhold Property Act of 1948 was of vital importance. This experience was reflected in the Spanish press but there is no record of its impact in official spheres.

Commonhold planning did not reflect a commitment to an ideal property that would guarantee the moral order of the home, as promoted in Falangist and National-Catholic discourse. Instead, it was more of an instrument to facilitate property transfer and stimulate the private property market. This possibility was not highly valued by Falangism. In this context, Arrese’s

actions as the new Minister of Housing, after he had been ousted from his position as General Secretary of the Movement, could illustrate his speaking and propaganda skills to support the new economic liberalisation that was being imposed by Opus Dei technocrats, rather than a genuinely Falangist expression.

At the end of Franco's regime, the high rates of homeownership in the working-class suburbs seem to confirm the success of José Luis Arrese's slogan. However, high homeownership did not appear to be the result of Falangist ideology or an expression of social justice, and it did not have the expected effect of social pacification.

## PROLETARIAN SUBURBS, PROPRIETARY SUBURBS: THE REVOLUTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE, 1960–1975

Barcelona maintained higher percentages of rental housing than in Madrid and other large cities. However, an analysis of Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) housing censuses from the end of the Franco regime and the early years of democracy provides firm evidence of a dramatic shift from renting to homeownership, as well as the pioneering role of the working-class suburbs. In 1950, only 5.2% of dwellings in Barcelona were owned by heads of households, a situation that was similar to the 6.7% of 1930.<sup>9</sup> In 1960, when cohabitation, overcrowding and self-build were at the highest levels of the century in Barcelona, owned homes only represented 11.2% of the total, compared to an overwhelming 84.4% of rental homes.<sup>10</sup> However, the percentage of homeownership tripled in the decade of 1960–1970 to reach a significant 34.2% (of which 18.5% were still paying for the property and 15.7% had already paid for it)<sup>11</sup>.

The housing census of 1981 clearly confirmed the major shift in the city of Barcelona: 52% of homes in the city were owned compared to 46% that were rented<sup>12</sup>.

This increase in homeownership has a paradoxical social bias. In 1970, the large districts 9 and 10, which were of a more working-class nature and experienced the greatest urban growth in this period, had percentages of homeownership of around 44%. In contrast, districts 3 and 11, which had only just begun to grow, were of higher status and therefore had much lower homeownership percentages of under 30% in all cases (29% and 22%). In these neighbourhoods, many of the dwellings that were constructed were rental properties and benefited from some form of protection. This was much more difficult, and consequently less common, in the districts that were weaker economically (Fig. 2).

In some suburban working-class districts, the high rates of homeownership in 1970 were mainly associated with new properties. In these districts, the number of dwellings (and inhabitants) easily tripled between 1950 and 1970, while it only increased by 70% in the city. The new estates, and the old low houses that were replaced on a large scale by four or five storey buildings in the 1960s and 1970s in particular, housed families that had moved for the

first time to these areas. Data on municipalities in the metropolitan working-class belt further strengthen this idea and should be interpreted in terms of the total continuity of the situation in the two large working-class districts of Barcelona. In 1960, the proportion of working population in these districts clearly exceeded that of Barcelona. Around 60% of the city's population was actively working, while the percentage of working population in the closest municipalities to Barcelona, including Hospitalet, Cornellà, Badalona, Santa Coloma and Sant Adrià del Besós, far exceeded 80%<sup>13</sup>. With much more modest housing stock and more serious conditions of overcrowding than Barcelona, as well as rates of homeownership that were already high in 1950, in the decade of the 1960s the percentage of owned flats reached between 57% and 65% (Fig. 3).

It was precisely in this decade when overcrowding in working class dwellings began to fall dramatically. Prior to this, overcrowding had risen steadily since the interwar years, particularly during the harsh decades of the 1940s and 1950s. By 1960, the alarming figure of close of six people in each main dwelling had been reached. Ten years later, the figure had dropped to under four, which was the sharpest inflection of the curve in the entire century. Working-class housing conditions in the neighbourhood of Nou Barris in Barcelona in the 1970s show the clear consolidation of a situation that was not prosperous in relative terms but was definitely far from the precariousness of the early years of the Franco regime<sup>14</sup>. The proportion of small dwellings was still extremely high. Homes in this neighbourhood were smaller than the average for the city and for the metropolitan area: 60% were under 70 m<sup>2</sup> and 28% were between 70 and 100 m<sup>2</sup>. Hardly any dwellings had more than one shower or bathroom. However, at the end of the 1960s and early years of the 1970s, it seemed that the precariousness of the early years of the Franco regime was over in these suburban neighbourhoods. During this period, there was also a revolution in the equipment inside houses. Possession of a radio or telephone had been a rarity among the working class of Barcelona in 1950 but became a mass phenomenon. In 1968, between 54% and 67% of these homes had a television, while seven years later all skilled workers had one, as well as the majority of non-skilled workers.

The changes in the parameters of habitability and in consumption habits were not the result of the Falange's paternalistic ideas or its political action. Within a tax system that was clearly regressive, the housing policy meant that the weaker social sectors subsidised families with higher incomes. The support provided by official protection covered the construction of high-class rental homes, while many of the more economically disadvantaged consumers had to purchase homes on the housing market, with the added effort that this represented<sup>15</sup>.

The new context contributed strongly to tying individuals to the home and to the progressive decline in neighbourhood sociability. However, in contrast to the expectations of Arrese, who saw in homeownership an instrument to domesticate the working classes, the final years of the Franco regime was the period with the most neighbourhood movements in the working-class suburbs.




Fig. 4. Increase in dwellings by administrative neighborhoods in absolute figures, 1947-1970.




Fig. 5. Rates of immigration -Spaniards born outside Catalonia-, 1970




Fig. 6. Rates of workers in industry, services, communication and transportation, 1970.



## HOUSING, PROPERTY, AND NEIGHBOURHOOD MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF NOU BARRIS IN BARCELONA

Although generally overlooked by the historiography of urban movements and in contrast to the tradition of rent strikes, property (often precarious or imperfect) is a relevant variable in various phases and types of neighbourhood actions<sup>16</sup>. This is especially relevant in the district of Nou Barris, the area at the outskirts of the city with the highest growth in the municipality of Barcelona between 1947 and 1970, the most working-class and with more immigration (Figs. 4, 5, 6). Furthermore, the first to organise themselves were self-built neighbourhoods constructed in the two decades after the war<sup>17</sup>. The transformation of the district is also related to the implementation of the Barcelona Social Emergency Plan of 1958. This planning gave rise to some of the most characteristic residential estates in the area, such as Guineueta and Porta. But it also allowed for less visible investments, such as the construction of collectors, essential in the northern part of the district, which practically lacks sewerage. Residents of these areas, united by the fact that their properties were still precarious from a legal perspective and had incomplete domestic facilities, came together to construct shared basic infrastructure such as a sewer. This was the case of residents in the self-built area of Roquetes Altas (Nou Barris), who took advantage of holidays in the summer of 1964, or the neighbourhood association created around this time in the self-built neighbourhood of Ca n' Oriach (Sabadell)<sup>18</sup>.

These actively organised neighbourhoods moved from the welfare assistance provided by parish and social centres to the strengthening of independent neighbourhood structures, and finally to involvement in conflicts and collective actions that went beyond the narrow legality of the Franco regime<sup>19</sup>. Examples of this situation could be the protests about the lack of road safety and traffic lights in Trinitat (in 1964), or the occupation of the Barcelona-Granollers motorway at the end of 1969 and in 1971, by residents of Torre Baró and Vallbona protesting the lack of connection between these two neighbourhoods that had been historically linked<sup>20</sup>. This type of collective action culminated in many suburban neighbourhoods in the formation of increasingly powerful, decisive neighbourhood associations. Such associations rose up radically against the municipality of Barcelona when, between 1969 and 1973, new partial masterplans for reforming large roads such as the Meridiana or the Ronda ring road were announced that implied the potential destruction of over 4,000 dwellings in Nou Barris, thus threatening the insecure ownership of the homes. In the resulting protest, the Meridiana road was cut, and a plenary municipal meeting was stormed, causing the subsequent fall of various mayors.

In the metropolitan estates of the Syndical Housing Authority (OSH), constructed in the 1950s, the legal insecurity of the confusing system of deferred homeownership was the determining factor behind the movements between 1969 and 1973. The strikes in payment of the instalments for purchasing the dwellings are the best example of this type of collective action, which was initially isolated, but subsequently coordinated with other estates in the metropolitan area and Barcelona itself, such as Trinitat Nova and Verdum in Nou Barris<sup>21</sup>.

When the issue of basic, permanent shelter with water and electricity supplies and legal security had been resolved, demands focused on shortfalls in the area outside the home. Com-

plaints about the serious lack of school places, nurseries, public services and green spaces also spread to the large estates of privately constructed dwellings. The development companies' offices were often in the same neighbourhood. Examples are the Ciudad Satélite in Cornellà from 1969, or the Ciudad Meridiana in 1973. Finally, the reform of the Regional Plan between 1974 and 1976 provided an opportunity to bring together many of these demands<sup>22</sup>.

It can be concluded that the imperfect ownership of dwellings, as a result of self-build or the Syndical Housing Authority's property developments, was one of the reasons for the start and radical nature of many of the neighbourhood movements during the second stage of Franco's dictatorship. In the Nou Barris district, this radicalism moved from "north to south": from the more working-class areas with the most imperfect homeownership to areas with a higher economic level and more orthodox homeownership.

At a time of economic crisis and unemployment, access to home ownership was a entrenched factor, while neighborhood struggles, although radical, joined the anti-Franco forces and become a mechanism for public awareness. New democracy and new municipal policies consolidated the process of inclusion. A dynamic that contrasts with the eruption, around 1980 in many European cities, of new urban violence motivated by ethnic segregation, the mechanisms of social exclusion and the lack of prospects of a disappointed young citizenry.

## CONCLUSION

If we define homeownership in current terms, we cannot consider it to be a cultural legacy of the Falange. The notion of ownership in speeches and in the social housing policy inspired by the Falange had an eminently moral tone and was associated with submission to the established order. It resulted in an imperfect form of ownership that made transfer of properties and the definitive empowerment of the user difficult. Significantly, allocation criteria not only privileged war veterans, syndicate officials and large families, but also required syndicate membership and in general guarantees of ideological and moral order. The change occurred with the approval of the Commonhold Act of 1960, which was key to the effective spread of commonholds. It made the transfer of properties and their entry into the market easier. In addition, it was a closer reflection of Opus Dei technocrats' programme of economic liberalisation, rather than Falangist interventionism.

It was this new legal framework in the context of the new liberalised economic dynamics that decisively accelerated access to homeownership from 1960. This process was visible in Barcelona and contributed, although gradually, to overcoming the terrible working-class housing conditions. It coincided with an increase in consumption and better facilities in homes, and with the development of planning figures such as the *Pla Comarcal*, the partial masterplans, or the Social Emergency Plan, which consolidated ordinances and minimum infrastructure requirements for the home. The high rates of property ownership in the working-class suburbs of the city and the metropolitan area may be surprising. In new, higher-status neighbour-

hoods the rates of homeownership were much lower. Most dwellings for the middle and upper classes were constructed with the support of official protection and were rental properties. In contrast, as there was no offering of affordable rental housing for working-class families, they were forced to make an additional effort to purchase homes. This paradox arose from a series of contradictory decisions and was inherent in the regressive tax system of the Franco regime, which often subsidised families that had higher incomes but did not cover weaker social sectors to the same extent.

Clearly, ownership tied people to their homes and, in a different way, to the neighbourhood. However, the expectations of the leading housing minister, Arrese, were not met. He considered homeownership a tool for the domestication of the working classes. It is easy to see the extent to which the large neighbourhood movements in these working-class suburbs, which were highly politicised in the final years of the Franco regime, were largely due to the imperfect homeownership that was a legacy of the decades of Falangist power. In these suburbs, the radicalism of the neighborhood movements contributed decisively to the construction of a shared citizenship. In contrast to what was happening in some European cities, where the first urban violence born of ethnic exclusion and the lack of prospects for the future began to manifest itself.

## DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

The authors are members of the BARRIO research group at the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Their research has been published in the book *La revolució de l'habitatge a les perifèries obreres i populars: Nou Barris 1939-1980*. Barcelona: MUHBA Documents, 2021. This work was supported by the Ministry of Science and Innovation of the Spanish Government under Grant HAR2017-82965R.

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## IMAGE SOURCES

All Figures: Authors' own elaboration

## ENDNOTES

7. José Candela Ochotorena, *Del pisito a la burbuja inmobiliaria. La herencia cultural falangista de la vivienda en propiedad, 1939-1959*, (Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 2019).
8. Falange was a fascist organization, founded in 1933, that became the only official political party of Spain under Franco.
9. *Ibid*, 105.
10. M. Vidal Andolz, 'El problema de la vivienda y sus perspectivas de solución', *La Vanguardia*, Wednesday 12 December 1945, p. 1.
11. Xavier Tafunell, "La construcción: una gran industria i un gran negoci", *Història Econòmica de la Catalu-nya Contemporània*. s. XX, vol. 6 (Barcelona: Enciclopèdia Catalana, 1989), 224-230.
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14. The analytical results of this Committee were published in summary in the *Boletín de Información de la Dirección General de Arquitectura*. r\," 18, 1951, p. 3-7.
15. Oyón, José Luis, Maldonado, José, Griful, Eulàlia, *Barcelona 1930: un atlas social*. cit. INE, *Censo de edifi-cios y viviendas de 1950*, cit. These census figures, obtained with a sample of 10%, coincide with figures for a sample of 2.5% carried out directly by Borja Iglesias using family sheets of the Municipal Register of 1950, which gave a percentage of 6.4% homeownership. In municipalities in the metropolitan and working-class belt of the city, the rates of homeownership were higher. This is probably because the town centres, which were inhabited by middle and upper classes, and areas where agricultural production persisted would have had higher rates of homeownership. Homeownership rates were around 18 to 20% in Badalona and Hospitalet and from 37 to 40% in Santa Coloma, Sant Boi, Terrassa and Sabadell.
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21. Xavier Tafunell, 235.
22. Carme Trilla, "La transformació del règim de tinença de l'habitatge. El cas de Barcelona", *Jornada Habi-tar Barcelona al segle XX: Accés a l'habitatge, veïns i ciutat, 1945-1993*, MUHBA-Oliva Artés, 22 March 2017.
23. José Miguel Cuesta Gómez, *El moviment veïnal al Barcelonès Nord*, op. cit., p. 142.
24. Xavier Domènech Sampere, *Quan el carrer va deixar de ser seu*. p. 137-139.
25. Iván Bordetas Jiménez, "De la supervivència a la resistència...", op. cit., pp. 73 and 92, taken from Ricard Martínez, *El moviment veïnal a l'àrea metropolitana de Barcelona durant el tardofranquisme i la transició: el cas de Sabadell (1966-1976)*, Unpublished doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu i Fabra, 1999.
26. Iván Bordetas Jiménez, "De la supervivència a la resistència...", op. cit., pp. 101-102.
27. José Antonio Dols, "La OSH y el usuario. Los barrios de la OSH: crónica de un conflicto, Cuadernos de

Arquitectura y Urbanismo, 105, 1974, pp. 74-81. See also the two reports drawn up by the relevant neighbourhood associations: "Informe barrios Obra Sindical del Hogar, 1973 and "Dos años de lucha contra la OSH: abril 1973-abril 1975", offprint of *Nou Barris*, April 1975.

28. Iván Bordeas Jiménez, "*De la supervivencia a la resistencia...*", op. cit., pp. 110-111.

