Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?
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hdl:2099/8227
Tipus de documentArticle
Data publicació2009-06
EditorSchool of Industrial and Aeronautic Engineering of Terrassa (ETSEIAT). Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
Condicions d'accésAccés obert
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continguts d'aquesta obra estan subjectes a la llicència de Creative Commons
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Reconeixement-NoComercial 3.0 Espanya
Abstract
The central purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive contract as an
equilibrium phenomenon. We analyse a model of vertical differentiation in which we deal
with the strategic role of the competitor’s decisions in a successive duopoly. Is it better for
a processor to offer an incentive contract to an upstream producer or the spot market? We
determine the equilibrium of a game in which the processors simultaneously decide
whether to offer an incentive contract or to continue at the spot market to acquire their
input. Our results show that under successive duopoly, offering an incentive contract
constitutes the unique equilibrium solution, which highlights the incentive contract
persistence.
CitacióFernández Olmos, Marta [et al.]. Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?. "Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management", Juny 2009, vol. 2, núm. 1, p. 208-259.
Dipòsit legalB-28744-2008
ISSN2013-0953
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