Mostra el registre d'ítem simple
Pure bargaining problems with a coalition structure
dc.contributor.author | Carreras Escobar, Francisco |
dc.contributor.author | Owen Salazar, Guillermo |
dc.contributor.other | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-09-08T11:00:25Z |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-08T00:30:26Z |
dc.date.issued | 2016-08 |
dc.identifier.citation | Carreras, F., Owen, G. Pure bargaining problems with a coalition structure. "Homo oeconomicus", Agost 2016, vol. 33, núm. 1-2, p. 93-120. |
dc.identifier.issn | 0943-0180 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2117/89737 |
dc.description | The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s41412-016-0007-2 |
dc.description.abstract | We consider here pure bargaining problems endowed with a coalition structure such that each union is given its own utility. In this context we use the Shapley rule in order to assess the main options available to the agents: individual behavior, cooperative behavior, isolated unions behavior, and bargaining unions behavior. The latter two respectively recall the treatment given by Aumann–Drèze and Owen to cooperative games with a coalition structure. A numerical example illustrates the procedure. We provide criteria to compare any pair of behaviors for each agent, introduce and axiomatically characterize a modified Shapley rule, and determine its natural domain, that is, the set of problems where the bargaining unions behavior is the best option for all agents. |
dc.format.extent | 28 p. |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.subject | Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa |
dc.subject.lcsh | Business mathematics |
dc.subject.lcsh | Cooperative games (Mathematics) |
dc.subject.lcsh | Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models |
dc.subject.other | Pure bargaining problem |
dc.subject.other | Coalition structure |
dc.subject.other | Shapley rule |
dc.title | Pure bargaining problems with a coalition structure |
dc.type | Article |
dc.subject.lemac | Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) |
dc.subject.lemac | Jocs, Teoria de |
dc.subject.lemac | Matemàtica financera |
dc.subject.lemac | Negociació comercial -- Models matemàtics |
dc.contributor.group | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s41412-016-0007-2 |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed |
dc.subject.ams | Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences |
dc.rights.access | Open Access |
local.identifier.drac | 18851266 |
dc.description.version | Postprint (author's final draft) |
dc.relation.projectid | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//MTM2012-34426/ES/TEORIA DE JUEGOS: FUNDAMENTOS MATEMATICOS Y APLICACIONES/ |
local.citation.author | Carreras, F.; Owen, G. |
local.citation.publicationName | Homo oeconomicus |
local.citation.volume | 33 |
local.citation.number | 1-2 |
local.citation.startingPage | 93 |
local.citation.endingPage | 120 |
Fitxers d'aquest items
Aquest ítem apareix a les col·leccions següents
-
Articles de revista [3.267]
-
Articles de revista [110]