Rights accessRestricted access - publisher's policy
(embargoed until 2017-06-08)
We consider here pure bargaining problems endowed with a coalition structure such that each union is given its own utility. In this context we use the Shapley rule in order to assess the main options available to the agents: individual behavior, cooperative behavior, isolated unions behavior, and bargaining unions behavior. The latter two respectively recall the treatment given by Aumann–Drèze and Owen to cooperative games with a coalition structure. A numerical example illustrates the procedure. We provide criteria to compare any pair of behaviors for each agent, introduce and axiomatically characterize a modified Shapley rule, and determine its natural domain, that is, the set of problems where the bargaining unions behavior is the best option for all agents.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s41412-016-0007-2
CitationCarreras, F., Owen, G. Pure bargaining problems with a coalition structure. "Homo oeconomicus", Agost 2016, vol. 33, núm. 1-2, p. 93-120.
All rights reserved. This work is protected by the corresponding intellectual and industrial property rights. Without prejudice to any existing legal exemptions, reproduction, distribution, public communication or transformation of this work are prohibited without permission of the copyright holder. If you wish to make any use of the work not provided for in the law, please contact: firstname.lastname@example.org