Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such
as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game
or a yes–no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which
collections of “yea” votes yield passage of the issue at hand, each of these
collections of “yea” voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested in
performing a complexity analysis on problems defined on such families of
games. This analysis as usual depends on the game representation used as
input. We consider four natural explicit representations: winning, losing,
minimal winning, and maximal losing. We first analyze the complexity of
testing whether a game is simple and testing whether a game is weighted.
We show that, for the four types of representations, both problems can be
solved in polynomial time. Finally, we provide results on the complexity
of testing whether a simple game or a weighted game is of a special type.
We analyze strongness, properness, decisiveness and homogeneity, which
are desirable properties to be fulfilled for a simple game. We finalize
with some considerations on the possibility of representing a game in a
more succinct representation showing a natural representation in which
the recognition problem is hard.
All rights reserved. This work is protected by the corresponding intellectual and industrial property rights. Without prejudice to any existing legal exemptions, reproduction, distribution, public communication or transformation of this work are prohibited without permission of the copyright holder. If you wish to make any use of the work not provided for in the law, please contact: firstname.lastname@example.org