Optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariff
Visualitza/Obre
Estadístiques de LA Referencia / Recolecta
Inclou dades d'ús des de 2022
Cita com:
hdl:2117/84459
Tipus de documentArticle
Data publicació2015-07
EditorOmniaScience
Condicions d'accésAccés obert
Llevat que s'hi indiqui el contrari, els
continguts d'aquesta obra estan subjectes a la llicència de Creative Commons
:
Reconeixement-NoComercial 3.0 Genèrica
Abstract
Purpose: Reducing carbon emission has been the core problem of controlling global warming
and climate deterioration recently. This paper focuses on the optimal carbon taxation policy
levied by countries and the impact on firms’ optimal production decisions.
Design/methodology/approach: This paper uses a two-stage game theory model to analyze
the impact of carbon tariff and tax. Numerical simulation is used to supplement the theoretical
analysis.
Findings: Results derived from the paper indicate that the demand in an unstable market is
significantly affected by environmental damage level. Carbon tariff is a policy-oriented tax while
the carbon tax is a market-oriented one. Comprehensive carbon taxation policy benefit
developed countries and basic policy is more suitable for developing countries.
Research limitations/implications: In this research, we do not consider random demand and
asymmetric information, which may not well suited the reality.
Originality/value: This work provides a different perspective in analyzing the impact of
carbon tax and tariff. It is the first study to consider two consuming market and the strategic game between two countries. Different international status of countries considered in the paper
is also a unique point.
CitacióHou, Yumei [et al.]. Optimal decisions of countries with carbon tax and carbon tariff. "Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management", Juliol 2015, vol. 8, núm. 3, p. 981-1001.
Dipòsit legalB-28744-2008
ISSN2013-0953
Fitxers | Descripció | Mida | Format | Visualitza |
---|---|---|---|---|
1506-7688-1-PB.pdf | 1,004Mb | Visualitza/Obre |