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A previous work by Friedman et al. (Theory and Decision, 61:305–318, 2006) introduces the concept of a hierarchy of a simple voting game and characterizes which hierarchies, induced by the desirability relation, are achievable in linear games. In this paper, we consider the problem of determining all hierarchies, conserving the ordinal equivalence between the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman
power indices, achievable in simple games. It is proved that only four hierarchies are
non-achievable in simple games.Moreover, it is also proved that all achievable hierarchies
are already obtainable in the class of weakly linear games. Our results prove that
given an arbitrary complete pre-ordering defined on a finite set with more than five elements, it is possible to construct a simple game such that the pre-ordering induced by the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman power indices coincides with the given pre-ordering.
CitationFreixas, J.; Pons, M. Hierarchies achievable in simple games. "Theory and decision", Abril 2010, vol. 68, núm. 4, p. 393-404.
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