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Pure bargaining problems are considered. By attaching a quasi–additive
cooperative game to each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of
problems is derived from the Shapley value for cooperative games. The
analysis of this new rule includes some axiomatic characterizations and a
comparison with the classical proportional rule.
CitationCarreras, F. On pure bargaining problems. A: Congreso Galego de Estatística e Investigación de Operacións. "IX Congreso Galego de Estatística e Investigación de Operacións". Ourense: 2009, p. 167-172.
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