Recent Submissions

  • Measuring the relevance of factors in the occurrence of events 

    Fragnelli, Vito; Freixas Bosch, Josep; Pons Vallès, Montserrat; Sanmiquel Pera, Lluís (2014-05-09)
    Article
    Restricted access - publisher's policy
    A new way to compare the relevance of the different factors intervening in the occurrences of an event is presented and developed in this paper. The idea behind the method comes from cooperative game theory but the focus ...
  • Success and decisiveness on proper symmetric games 

    Freixas Bosch, Josep; Pons Vallès, Montserrat (2013-11-20)
    Article
    Restricted access - publisher's policy
    This paper provides a complete study for the possible rankings of success and decisiveness for individuals in symmetric voting systems, assuming anonymous and independent probability distributions. It is proved that for ...
  • On the time decay of solutions in micropolar viscoelasticity 

    Leseduarte Milán, María Carme; Magaña Nieto, Antonio; Quintanilla de Latorre, Ramón (2015-07-01)
    Article
    Restricted access - publisher's policy
    This paper deals with isotropic micropolar viscoelastic materials. It can be said that that kind of materials have two internal structures: the macrostructure, where the elasticity effects are noticed, and the ...
  • The golden number and Fibonacci sequences in the design of voting structures 

    Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kurz, Sascha (Elsevier, 2013)
    Article
    Open Access
    Some distinguished types of voters, as vetoes, passers or nulls, as well as some others, play a significant role in voting systems because they are either the most powerful or the least powerful voters in the game independently ...
  • Egalitarian property for power indices 

    Freixas Bosch, Josep; Marciniak, Dorota (Springer, 2013)
    Article
    Open Access
    In this study, we introduce and examine the Egalitarian property for some power indices on the class of simple games. This property means that after intersecting a game with a symmetric or anonymous game the difference ...
  • A note on multinomial (probabilistic) values 

    Domènech Blázquez, Margarita; Giménez Pradales, José Miguel; Puente del Campo, María Albina (2015)
    Conference lecture
    Open Access
    The work tries to contribute to a better understanding of multinomial values as a consistent alternative or complement to classical values (Shapley and Banzhaf). We compare the behavior of multinomial values with respect ...
  • The proportional partitional Shapley value 

    Alonso Meijide, José María; Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Costa Bouzas, Julián; García Jurado, Ignacio (2015-05)
    Article
    Restricted access - publisher's policy
    A new coalitional value is proposed under the hypothesis of isolated unions. The main difference between this value and the Aumann–Drèze value is that the allocations within each union are not given by the Shapley value ...
  • Coalitional multinomial probabilistic values 

    Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Puente del Campo, María Albina (Elsevier, 2015-08)
    Article
    Restricted access - publisher's policy
    We introduce a new family of coalitional values designed to take into account players’ attitudes with regard to cooperation. This new family of values applies to cooperative games with a coalition structure by combining ...
  • On the complexity of exchanging 

    Molinero Albareda, Xavier; Olsen, Martin; Serna Iglesias, María José (2015-03-24)
    External research report
    Open Access
    We analyze the computational complexity of the problem of deciding whether, for a given simple game, there exists the possibility of rearranging the participants in a set of j given losing coalitions into a set of j winning ...
  • Cooperation through social influence 

    Molinero Albareda, Xavier; Riquelme Csori, Fabián; Serna Iglesias, María José (Elsevier, 2015-05-01)
    Article
    Open Access
    We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. ...

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