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We introduce a new family of coalitional values designed to take into account players’ attitudes with regard to cooperation. This new family of values applies to cooperative games with a coalition structure by combining the Shapley value and the multinomial probabilistic values, thus generalizing the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues. Besides an axiomatic characterization, a computational procedure is provided in terms of the multilinear extension of the game and an application to the Catalonia Parliament, Legislature 2003–2007, is shown.
CitationCarreras, F.; Puente, M. Coalitional multinomial probabilistic values. "European journal of operational research", Agost 2015, vol. 245, núm. 1, p. 236-246.
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