Let us consider that somebody is extremely interested in increasing the probability of a proposal to be approved by a certain committee and that to achieve this goal he/she is prepared to pay off one member of the committee. In a situation like this one, and assuming that vote-buying is allowed and free of stigma, which voter should be offered a bribe? The potential decisiveness index for simple games, which measures the effect that ensuring one positive vote produces for the probability of passing the issue at hand, is a good tool with which to acquire the answer. An axiomatic characterization of this index is given in this paper, and its relation to other classical power indices is shown.
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of the Operational Research Society. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Freixas, J.; Pons, M. An axiomatic characterization of the potential decisiveness index. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2015, vol. 66, no. 3, p. 353-359 is available online at: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v66/n3/full/jors20145a.html
CitationFreixas, J.; Pons, M. An axiomatic characterization of the potential decisiveness index. "Journal of the Operational Research Society". 2015, vol. 66, n. 3, p. 353-359.
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