We propose a new power index based on the minimum sum representation (MSR) of a
weighted voting game. The MSR o ers a redesign of a voting game, such that voting power
as measured by the MSR index becomes proportional to voting weight. The MSR index is a
coherent measure of power that is ordinally equivalent to the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and
Johnston indices. We provide a characterization for a bicameral meet as a weighted game or
a complete game, and show that the MSR index is immune to the bicameral meet paradox.
We discuss the computation of the MSR index using a linear integer program and the inverse MSR problem of designing a weighted voting game with a given distribution of power.
CitationFreixas, J.; Kaniovski, S. The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power. "European journal of operational research", 16 Març 2014, vol. 233, núm. 3, p. 739-748.
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