Equilibrium strategy and population-size effects in lowest unique bid auctions
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10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.088701
Inclou dades d'ús des de 2022
Cita com:
hdl:2117/16410
Tipus de documentArticle
Data publicació2012-02-22
Condicions d'accésAccés obert
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Reconeixement-NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 3.0 Espanya
Abstract
In lowest unique bid auctions, N players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the lowest bid,
provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for
the equilibrium distribution of strategies. We then study the properties of the solution as a function of the
mean number of players, and compare them with a large data set of internet auctions. The theory agrees
with the data with striking accuracy for small population-size N, while for larger N a qualitatively
different distribution is observed.We interpret this result as the emergence of two different regimes, one in
which adaptation is feasible and one in which it is not. Our results question the actual possibility of a large
population to adapt and find the optimal strategy when participating in a collective game.
CitacióPigolotti, S. [et al.]. Equilibrium strategy and population-size effects in lowest unique bid auctions. "Physical review letters", 22 Febrer 2012, vol. 108, núm. 8, p. 1-5.
ISSN0031-9007
Versió de l'editorhttp://prl.aps.org/abstract/PRL/v108/i8/e088701
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pigolotti_physicalr.pdf | 514,4Kb | Visualitza/Obre |