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Pure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the proportional rule.
CitationCarreras, F.; Owen, G. Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule. "Homo oeconomicus", 2011, vol. 28, núm. 3, p. 379-404.
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