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Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?
dc.contributor.author | Fernández Olmos, Marta |
dc.contributor.author | Rosell Martínez, Jorge |
dc.contributor.author | Espitia Escuer, Manuel Antonio |
dc.contributor.author | Marín Vinuesa, Luz María |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-10-02T18:16:38Z |
dc.date.available | 2009-10-02T18:16:38Z |
dc.date.issued | 2009-06 |
dc.identifier.citation | Fernández Olmos, Marta [et al.]. Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?. "Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management", Juny 2009, vol. 2, núm. 1, p. 208-259. |
dc.identifier.issn | 2013-0953 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2099/8227 |
dc.description.abstract | The central purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive contract as an equilibrium phenomenon. We analyse a model of vertical differentiation in which we deal with the strategic role of the competitor’s decisions in a successive duopoly. Is it better for a processor to offer an incentive contract to an upstream producer or the spot market? We determine the equilibrium of a game in which the processors simultaneously decide whether to offer an incentive contract or to continue at the spot market to acquire their input. Our results show that under successive duopoly, offering an incentive contract constitutes the unique equilibrium solution, which highlights the incentive contract persistence. |
dc.format.extent | 22 p. |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.publisher | School of Industrial and Aeronautic Engineering of Terrassa (ETSEIAT). Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Spain |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/es/ |
dc.subject | Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Economia i organització d'empreses::Competitivitat i innovació |
dc.subject.lcsh | Incentives in industry |
dc.subject.lcsh | Business intelligence |
dc.subject.lcsh | Moral hazard |
dc.subject.other | Successive duopoly |
dc.title | Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist? |
dc.type | Article |
dc.subject.lemac | Incentius (Economia) |
dc.subject.lemac | Risc |
dc.subject.lemac | Empreses -- Direcció i administració |
dc.identifier.dl | B-28744-2008 |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed |
dc.rights.access | Open Access |
local.citation.author | Fernández Olmos, Marta; Rosell Martínez, Jorge; Espitia Escuer, Manuel Antonio; Marín Vinuesa, Luz María |
local.citation.publicationName | Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management |
local.citation.volume | 2 |
local.citation.number | 1 |
local.citation.startingPage | 208 |
local.citation.endingPage | 259 |
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2009, vol. 2, núm. 1 [15]